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INTRODUCTION
Observers of the Burger Court' have often noted that the Court
has rejected an expansive role for the judiciary in the area of criminal
*Instructor of Criminal Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1972;
J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1975. The author would like to thank Judith Lansky and James
Olds of the University of Wisconsin Law School, Class of 1980, for their research assistance.
The author would also like to thank Professor Frank Remington and Professor Walter Dickey of
the University of Wisconsin for their encouragement and editorial assistance.
1, The terms "Burger Court" and "Warren Court" are, of course, merely convenient short-
hand expressions. Numerous changes of personnel occurred during the tenures of both Chief
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law. 2 Recent decisions have promoted deference to the expertise of
the nonjudicial agencies of the criminal justice system. For example,
the Burger Court has generally shown less inclination to police the
police. Although the landmark Warren Court decision, Miranda v.
Arizona,3 has not been overruled, various limitations have been
placed on this prophylactic rule of police interrogations.4  The pres-
Justice Warren and Chief Justice Burger. The cases cited in the following notes are meant to be
indicative of the very general trends noted in the text. No attempt has been made to compile an
exhaustive compendium of Burger Court decisions in criminal law.
2. See L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW 439 (1974); C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
[-12 (1980); Allen, Foreword-Quiescence and Ferment: The 1974 Term in the Supreme Court,
66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 391 (1975); Berlow, Undercutting Miranda: The Burger Court
Way with Suspects, 224 THE NATION 498 (1976); Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J.
1198 (1971); George, From Warren to Burger to Chance: Future Trends in the Administration
of Criminal Justice, 12 CRIM. LAW. BULL. 253 (1976); Hartman, Foreword -The Burger
Court-1973 Term: Leaving the Sixties Behind Us, 65 J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437 (1974);
Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1320 (1977); Mason, The Burger Court in Historical Perspective, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 27
(1974); Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEO. L.J. 249
(1971); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger
Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974).
All the above works support the proposition for which they are cited to varying degrees. The
commentators show little uniformity, however. Compare L. LEVY, supra, at 421-41, who argues
that the Nixon appointees are advocates for law enforcement's cause who have succeeded in
undermining Warren Court precedents, with Israel, supra, at 1325-26, who contends that "in
most areas outside of police practices the Burger Court has tended either to expand upon the
Warren Court interpretations or to leave the governing guidelines largely as they stood under
Warren Court decisions."
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) ("interrogation" under Miranda
limited to words or actions reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response); North Carolina
v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (implicit waiver of Miranda rights found despite refusal to sign a
written waiver form and absence of express oral waiver); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492
(1977) (per curiam) (parolee invited to police station not "in custody"; Miranda requirements
limited to custodial interrogations); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (second interroga-
tion session upheld after defendant had initially waived his rights); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714 (1975) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment at trial);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (pre-Miranda interrogation leading to discovery of
witness not suppressible). But see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (prosecutor's comment on
defendant's silence after arrest and after Miranda warning is reversible error). But see Jenkins
v. Anderson, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980) (Doyle limited to post-arrest silence).
Numerous decisions have given the police greater power to search and arrest without a war-
rant. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (warrantless inventory search of
impounded automobile upheld); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (doctrine of hot
pursuit extended to authorize a warrantless arrest in public place of heroin suspect observed by
police officers in the doorway of her home); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)(warrantless arrest in public held permissible even though adequate opportunity to procure a
warrant); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam) (warrantless search of car at police
station following driver's arrest for attempt to pass fraudulent checks upheld); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (full search of
person incident to traffic arrest upheld); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (war-
rantless search without probable cause upheld on a consent theory despite failure to show de-
fendants were aware of right to refuse); cf Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (no fourth
amendment violation in warrantless seizure of automobile and examination of its exterior at
police impoundment area after car had been removed from public parking lot). But see Payton
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ent Court has limited the application of the exclusionary rule 5 amid
intimations of its complete demise by some members of the Court.6
Further illustrative of the general trend are decisions holding that the
procedures and criteria of the decision to grant parole do not impli-
cate the constitutional requirement of due process of law. 7 Recent
decisions that have denied constitutional status to issues having a sub-
stantial impact on the conditions of an inmate's confinement 8 reflect
decreasing judicial activism in the area of prison administration. 9  Fi-
v. New York, 446 U.S. 969 (1980) (fourth amendment forbids police practice of making war-
rantless, nonconsensual, nonexigent entries of suspects' homes for the purpose of making
"routine" felony arrests); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (fourth amendment for-
bids random police stops of vehicles on public streets for license and registration checks
without reasonable suspicion that some law is being violated); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979) (investigative seizures of suspects for questioning on less than the probable cause
necessary to make formal arrests not allowed); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (no
"murder scene" exception under the fourth amendment); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499
(1978), and Marshall v. Barlows Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrants required for administrative
searches).
Several Burger Court cases have given expansive readings to the allowable scope of police
intrusion in executing searches and seizures pursuant to judicial warrants. See, e.g., Dalia v.
United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979) (forcible surreptitious entry of private premises for the pur-
pose of installing a listening device permitted even if authority for entry is not spelled out in
order permitting electronic eavesdropping); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)
(fourth amendment does not forbid issuance of warrant to search for criminal evidence reason-
ably believed to be on premises of third party newspaper even though newspaper is not sus-
pected of involvement in crime). But see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (presence at the
scene of a valid fourth amendment search does not justify search).
The Warren Court ruling in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), requiring the
assistance of counsel at police line-ups, has been largely vitiated by the Burger Court decisions
of Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), and United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). Kirby
limited Wade to line-ups conducted after a formal charge has been filed. Ash held Wade in-
applicable to noncorporeal identification procedures conducted after indictment. But see Moore
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (Wade applies to an initial appearance show-up).
5. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980); United States v. Sal-
vucci, - U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). But see Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975).
6. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 n.3 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. at 500 (Burger, C.J., concurring), 536 (White, J., dissenting); Brown v. Il-
linois, 422 U.S. 590, 606-12 (1975) (Powell, J, concurring in part). Justice Rehnquist joined in
Justice Powell's concurrence in Brown.
7. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979). But see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972). See also Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
8. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974). But see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215 (1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974).
9. The Court itself has recently commented on this trend. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 562 (1979).
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nally, federal review of state court decisions through habeas corpus
jurisdiction has been markedly reduced. 10
A corollary of diminished judicial intervention, however, appears to
be a heightened concern with the rationality of judicial decisionmak-
ing. Whereas the Warren Court focused on pretrial stages of the
criminal process, the current Court seems more interested in direct-
ing the attention of the appellate courts to ensuring fairness and accu-
racy in the courtrooms within their jurisdictions, while rejecting an
expansive supervisory role of agencies outside of the judicial sphere."
In the 1978-1979 Supreme Court Term, the Court issued two
major decisions on a subject that clearly implicates the rationality of
the factfinding process at trial: criminal. presumptions. Although the
10. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
But see Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct., 410 U.S. 484 (1973); Hensley v. Municipal Ct., 411
U.S. 345 (1973). See also United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976); Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600 (1974).
11. One commentator has noted that
the current Court has been quite zealous in scrutinizing such Sixth Amendment
rights as the right to counsel and the right to a jury trial, because these guaranties
are viewed as essential to a fair trial, and an accurate determination of guilt....
The focus on the trial as the central battleground between the accused and the
government represents a substantial departure from the Warren Court's perspec-
tive.
C. WHITEBaREAD, supra note 2, at 5. Professor Whitebread, id. at 5 nn.29 & 30, cites the
following sixth amendment decisions of the Burger Court in support of his position: Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975). See also Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S.
357 (1979); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). But see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335
(1980); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). See also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980)
(post-trial constitutional protection).
The focus of the Burger Court on the accuracy of the trial process is perhaps best illustrated
by the Court's decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Although the Burger Court
has been contracting the scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, see note 10 supra, Jackson
held that claims of insufficiency of the evidence are cognizable in habeas petitions. This holding
is particularly surprising in light of the fact that it has been black letter law that sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claims are not generally available on collateral attack. Prior to Jackson, the only
exception to this principle was if the habeas petitioner could show that there was no evidence to
support his conviction. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). The doctrine of no review
of sufficiency claims was so firmly entrenched that "the Thompson decision was viewed as a
victory for habeas petitioners," despite the exacting standard that it established. The Supreme
Court 1978-79 Term, 25 CRIM. L. RPTR. 4137 (1979).
The expansion of the availability of sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims at a time when the
issues cognizable on federal habeas are otherwise shrinking is explained by the Court's
heightened concern with the rationality of the trial process. In Jackson, the Court emphasized
that claims of insufficient evidence are "far different" from illegal search and seizure issues. 443
U.S. at 323. Illegal search and seizure issues had been removed from federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction where the state court had provided a full and fair hearing because the propriety of
police conduct in obtaining the probative evidence was a collateral issue. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 485-86 (1976). In contrast, the Jackson Court stated that "[t]he question whether a
defendant has been convicted upon adequate evidence is central to the basic question of guilt or
innocence." 443 U.S. at 323. In Jackson, the Burger Court's concern with the rationality of the
trial process outweighed the Court's preference for less expansive federal court supervision.
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second decision, Sandstrom v. Montana,'2 typifies the recent
heightened concern with the rationality of the factfinding process, the
other, County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,' 3 diminishes the sig-
nificance of Sandstrom and presages a withdrawal from appellate re-
view of the rationality of deductive devices.
A presumption, or deductive device,' 4 is a legal mechanism that
allows or requires the factfinder to assume the existence of a fact
when proof of other facts is shown. The fact that must be proved is
called the basic fact; the fact that may or must be assumed upon proof
of the basic fact is the presumed fact. 15 A conclusive presumption
provides that upon proof of the basic fact, the presumed fact must be
found and cannot be overcome by rebutting evidence. 16  If the de-
ductive device provides that upon proof of the basic fact, the pre-
sumed fact must be found but is subject to rebuttal, the device is
commonly known as a mandatory presumption.1 7 The opponent of a
mandatory presumption is required to meet either a production or a
persuasion burden in rebutting the presumption.' 8 The party who
bears the burden of production, or, as it is sometimes phrased, the
"duty of going forward," loses when evidence is nonexistent or in-
adequate to meet a threshold requirement.1 9 The burden of persua-
sion becomes operative once the production burden is satisfied. The
burden of persuasion, alternatively described as the risk of nonper-
suasion, informs the members of the jury how to decide the issue if
their minds are in doubt. In that situation, the party having the bur-
den of persuasion has failed to satisfy that burden and the issue is to
be decided against him.2 °
The term presumption, or permissive presumption, is sometimes
also used to describe a permissive inference.21 A permissive infer-
ence provides that upon proof of the basic fact, the jury is permitted
but not required to find the existence of the presumed fact. 22 This
12. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
13. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
14. The term presumption is only a general label for a variety of standardized inferential
links between two facts or sets of facts.
15. For a compendium of meanings of both civil and criminal presumptions, see Laughlin,
In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195 (1953).
16. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 804 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MCCOIRMICK].
17. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 52 nn.54 & 55
(1972).
18. The distinction between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion is often
attributed to J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
355-59 (1898). See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 783 n.2.
19. See J. THAYER, supra note 18, at 355. The decision whether the production burden has
been met is for the judge. Failure to satisfy the threshold production burden operates in a jury
trial to remove the issue from the jury. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 789-92.
20. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 793-802.
21. See id. at 804 n.31.
22. See id. at 804.
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Article will refer to all types of presumptions by the neutral term
deductive devices because whether a device is mandatory or permis-
sive is the ultimate issue to be determined in reviewing many of the
cases discussed.
Since the seminal case of Tot v. United States,23 the Supreme
Court has reviewed the validity of a deductive device by assessing the
inferential leap between the proven or basic fact and the fact pre-
sumed to determine the rationality of the connection between the
facts. The "rational connection test," elaborated in Leary v. United
States,2 4 requires that the presumed fact must be more likely than
not to flow from the basic fact. In Leary, and in all cases after Tot,
the Court had evaded the frequent contention that in a criminal case
the connection between facts must satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt requirement, by finding the link between the basic and pre-
sumed fact either so weak as to fail even the rational connection test
or so strong as to satisfy a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.2 5 In
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, the Court finally addressed
the question by adopting a dual standard dependent upon the distinc-
tion between mandatory presumptions and permissive inferences.
Permissive inferences are twice blessed: the inferential link is not
subjected to facial review, that is, it is not tested for accuracy in the
abstract but only as applied to the facts of a given case;2 6 and there
need be only a rational connection between basic and presumed
facts. 27 Mandatory presumptions, on the other hand, are doubly
burdened by the prospect of appellate review because they will be
facially examined by a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.2
The first section of this Article will examine the divergent ap-
proaches of Allen and Sandstrom and the impact of the two cases on
23. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
24. 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
25. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845, 846 n.ll (1973); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 416, 419, 422 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 n.64 (1969).
26. See notes 44-61 and accompanying text infra.
27. Allen retained Leary's "more likely than not" gloss on the rational connection test.
County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165 (1979).
28. This conclusion is less certain than the holding that permissive inferences need only
satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard. In dictum the Allen Court mentioned the standard of
review to be applied to mandatory presumptions: "In the latter situation [referring to cases
involving mandatory presumptions], since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing
guilt, it may not rest its case entirely upon a presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient to
support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 167. An earlier note in the
opinion had pointed out that some mandatory presumptions affect a shift in the burden of
persuasion while others shift only the burden of production: "To the extent that a presumption
imposes an extremely low burden of production,-e.g., being satisfied by 'any' evidence-it
may well be that its impact is no greater than that of a permissive inference, and it may be
proper to analyze it as such." Id. at 157-58 n.16 (citation omitted). The Court appears to have
left open the possibility that facial review and/or a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard may not
be required for all mandatory presumptions.
[Vol. 33
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the review of deductive devices. The second section will examine
Allen's claim that it is the progeny of a long line of precedents. The
combined impact of Sandstrom and Allen will be shown to be an
increased appellate scrutiny of the type or form of a deductive device
with a corresponding decrease in appellate review of the rationality of
its content. The third section of the Article will demonstrate that the
formalistic result of Sandstrom and Allen has a coercive impact on
jury verdicts that imperils the rationality of the factfinding process. A
similar formalistic trend by the Supreme Court in its treatment of
affirmative defenses will be examined in the fourth section of the Ar-
ticle and an attempt will be made to understand the imperatives that
have led the Court virtually to abandon the review of permissive in-
ferences. Finally, suggestions will be offered for instructing the jury
in ways that will accommodate the valid concerns discussed in the
fourth section of the Article without unduly prejudicing jury delibera-
tions.
I. COUNTY COURT OF ULSTER COUNTY V. ALLEN 2 9 AND
SANDSTROM V. MONTANA 
3 0
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen dealt with a New York
statute providing that the presence of a firearm or another of several
enumerated types of weapons in an automobile is "presumptive evi-
dence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile." 31
Three adult males and a sixteen-year-old female, referred to by the
pseudonym of Jane Doe, were jointly tried and convicted of charges
that they illegally possessed two loaded handguns. The handguns
were found stuffed into Jane Doe's open handbag, which was located
29. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
30. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
31. The full statutory section provides:
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus, of any
firearm, defaced firearm, firearm silencer, explosive or incendiary bomb,
bombshell, gravity knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack,
metal knuckles, chuka stick, sandbag, sandclub or slungshot is presumptive evi-
dence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at the time such
weapon, instrument or appliance is found, except under the following cir-
cumstances: (a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found upon the person of
one of the occupants therein; (b) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found
in an automobile which is being operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the
due, lawful and proper pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall not apply
to the driver; or (c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one of the
occupants, not present under duress, has in his possession a valid license to have
and carry concealed the same.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1979). Another statutory section, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 265.20 (McKinney 1979) contains statutory exceptions for weapons present due to certain
military, law enforcement, recreational, and commercial purposes.
19811
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on either the front floor or the front seat of the car on the passenger
side. 32 The four defendants were acquitted of charges of illegal pos-
session of a loaded machine gun and over a pound of heroin found in
the locked trunk of the car. 33
At trial, the state introduced as evidence the objects seized from
the car. All four defendants objected that the state had not dem-
onstrated an adequate evidentiary connection between the four de-
fendants and the contraband, The trial court overruled the objection
on the basis of the statutory "presumption." 34  Aside from the evi-
dence of the seized objects, the state's case consisted principally of
the testimony of the two arresting officers who had stopped the car to
issue a speeding citation. One of the officers testified that he had
observed in "open view" a portion of a .45-caliber automatic pistol
protruding from the open purse in the car. In securing the gun, he
observed a second handgun, a .38-caliber revolver, in the same
handbag. 35 Following the arrest, the heroin and the loaded machine
gun were discovered in the locked trunk of the car. 3 6 At the close of
the evidence, the judge instructed the jury that the state had relied
upon the testimony of the two arresting officers and the presumption
"to establish the unlawful possession of the weapons." 37  The jury
was also instructed as follows:
Our Penal Law also provides that the presence in an automobile of any
machine gun or of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is presumptive
evidence of their unlawful possession.
In other words, these presumptions or this latter presumption upon
proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons, you may
infer and draw a conclusion that such prohibited weapon was possessed by
each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the time when such
instruments were found [sic]. The presumption or presumptions is effec-
tive only so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting the con-
clusion flowing from the presumption, 'and the presumption is said to dis-
appear when such contradictory evidence is adduced. 3
The convictions of Samuel Allen and his two adult codefendants
were affirmed by the New York Appellate Division 39 and the New
32. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he evidence would have allowed the jury to conclude
either that the handbag was on the front floor or front seat." 442 U.S. at 163 n.25. Both the
Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals had found that the handbag was on the
floor. See Allen v. County Ct., 568 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1977); People v. Lemmons, 40
N.Y.2d 505, 508-09, 354 N.E.2d 836, 838-39, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (1976).
33. A statutory deductive device similar to that for weapons was created for controlled sub-
stances by N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.25(1) (McKinney 1979).
34. 442 U.S. at 144-45.
35. Id. at 143 n.2.
36. Id. at 143-44. See also id. at 155 n. 14.
37. Id. at 160-61 n.19.
38. Id. at 161 n.20 (emphasis added).
39. The New York Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. People v. Lemmons, 49
A.D.2d 639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1975).
[Vol. 33
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York Court of Appeals, 40 but the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted these defendants' petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. 4' The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed, 42 holding that the statutory "presump-
tion" was unconstitutional on its face because the "presumption obvi-
ously sweeps within its compass (1) many occupants who may not
know they are riding with a gun (which may be out of their sight),
and (2) many who may be aware of the presence of the gun but [are]
not permitted access to it." 4 3
In a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme
Court chastised the court of appeals for testing the fairness of the
statutory inference in "hypothetical situations," 44 stating that a party
lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of statutes as applied
to third parties. 45  In the majority's view, whether the defendants
had standing to raise the arguments found decisive by the court of
appeals depended on the type of presumption involved in the
case. 46 The Court stated that a mandatory presumption must be
examined on its face 47 since the jury is required to find the pre-
sumed fact upon proof of the basic fact at least until the defendant
40. People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976). The New
York Court of Appeals summarily rejected appellant's constitutional attack after reviewing the
evidence concerning the location of the handguns. The court of appeals held that sufficient
evidence had been presented to create a question for the jury, that the court could not "con-
clude that as a matter of law the presumption was inapplicable," id. at 512, 354 N.E.2d at 841,
387 N.Y.S.2d at 102, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
41. Allen v. County Ct., 76 Civ. 4794 (S.D.N.Y. April 19, 1977), reprinted in Petitioner's
Brief for Certiorari at 33a-36a. "Jane Doe," who was adjudicated a youthful offender and given a
sentence of five years probation, did not join in the habeas corpus petition. See Allen v. County
Ct. of Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998, 1000 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977). The district court issued the writ
on the grounds that the appellants had not deliberately bypassed their federal claim, a holding
that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not address, and that the mere presence of
the guns in the handbag could not reasonably give rise to the inference of possession by the
other three occupants of the car.
42. Allen v. County Ct. of Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977).
43. Id. at 1007. The court of appeals added:
Nothing about a gun, which may be only a few inches in length (e.g., a Baretta or
Derringer) and concealed under a seat, in a glove compartment or beyond the reach
of all but one of the car's occupants, assures that its presence is known to occupants
who may be hitchhikers or other casual passengers, much less that they have any
dominion or control over it.
id.
44. 442 U.S. at 155. The Court first rejected the contention that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the habeas corpus petition on the merits under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be-
cause the New York court's affirmance of the conviction was based on an adequate state pro-
cedural ground. Id. at 147-54.
45. The Court noted that the limited exception to the standing requirement for statutes
broadly prohibiting free speech protected by the first amendment "has no application to a stat-
ute that enhances the legal risks associated with riding in vehicles containing dangerous
weapons." Id. at 155.
46. Id. at 156.
47. By "facial review" the Court meant that the deductive device is tested for accuracy in
isolation from the facts of the case by considering it in possible or hypothetical fact situations.
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produces "some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between
the two facts." 48 In the absence of rebutting evidence, the jury may
not reject a mandatory presumption. In contrast, a permissive infer-
ence was found not to be as troublesome since it merely allows, but
does not require, the jury to find the presumed fact upon proof of the
basic fact. Thus there is no shift in the burden of production or per-
suasion. 49 The Allen majority stated that the due process require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is imperiled only if there is
no rational way that the jury could draw the inference offered by the
statute 50 under the facts of the case. 5' If the presumption is only an
inference or a permissive presumption, as the Court most frequently
referred to it, a defendant must demonstrate its invalidity as applied
to him. 52
The Court claimed that it had previously undertaken a facial valid-
ity analysis only in cases involving mandatory presumptions, 53 citing
Tot v. United States,54 Leary v. United States,55 United States v.
Romano, 56 and the first of two deductive devices considered in
Turner v. United States.57 In contrast, the Court stated that when
reviewing permissive inferences such as those at issue in Barnes v.
United States 58 and United States v. Gainey 59 and the second of the
deductive devices considered in Turner,60 it had determined their
validity in the context of the particular facts of each case. 61
Within this analytic framework, the Allen majority had little trouble
in reversing the Second Circuit and upholding the validity of the
"statutory permissive presumption." The jury instructions made it
clear that the "presumption" was only a "permissive inference" that
could be ignored by the jury even in the absence of rebuttal evi-
dence.6 2 As applied to the facts of the case, the permissive inference
of possession of the weapons from proof of their presence in the au-
48. Id. at 157.
49. See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
50. Inferences and presumptions may also be judicially created. See, e.g., Barnes v. United
States, 412 U.S. 838, 839-40 (1973). In fact, deductive devices were originally made by judges
through the common law. However, the legislative branch now dominates the creation of these
devices. See Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30, 59 (1977).
51. 442 U.S. at 157.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 157-59.
54. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
55. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
56. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
57. 396 U.S. 398, 408-18 (1970).
58. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
59. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
60. 396 U.S. at 419-24.
61. 442 U.S. at 157.
62. Id. at 160-62.
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tomobile satisfied the rational connection test.63 Although the two
handguns were in Jane Doe's purse, the Court noted that she was a
sixteen-year-old girl in the presence of three adult men.6 4 The guns
were too large to be concealed in the purse, causing it to bulge open.
Because the purse was in easy reach of the driver and "even perhaps
of the other two respondents who were riding in the rear seat," it was
reasonable to infer that "Jane Doe was not the only person able to
exercise dominion" over the weapons contained in the purse. 65
Justice Powell, writing for the four dissenters, found no recognition
in the Court's prior decisions of a bright line distinguishing manda-
tory and permissive presumptions. 66 Justice Powell argued that the
facial rationality of the permissive inference in Allen must be deter-
mined because the inference authorized the jury to reach its verdict
even if it disbelieved all the prosecution's evidence except for the
proof of presence of the weapons in the car. 67 By sustaining the
convictions because of the existence of sufficient evidence, the major-
ity was applying an "unarticulated harmless error" analysis, since the
jury might have relied solely on the statutory inference that the dis-
sent labeled "plainly irrational." 68
Two weeks after the Allen decision, the Court decided a second
major case involving criminal presumptions: Sandstrom v. Montana.69
David Sandstrom had confessed to the killing with which he was
charged. At trial, the defense sought only to prove that Sandstrom
was guilty of a lesser crime than "deliberate homicide." 70 The de-
fense presented evidence that the defendant had a personality disor-
der which, aggravated by alcohol consumption, precluded the possi-
bility that he had acted "purposely or knowingly," as required by the
statutory definition of deliberate homicide. 7' Over defense objec-
tion, the trial court granted the prosecution's request to instruct the
jury that "It]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary con-
63. Id. at 163-65.
64. Id. at 163-64.
65. Id. at 163. The jury was instructed that "'possession" could be actual or constructive, but
that even constructive possession required intent and ability to retain control or dominion over
the articles possessed. Id. at 161-62 n.21.
66. Id. at 170 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 175-76.
68. Id. at 177.
69. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Allen was decided on June 4, 1979. The Sandstrom decision was
issued on June 18, 1979.
70. 442 U.S. at 512.
71. Id. The Montana criminal homicide statute provides: "(1) A person commits the offense
of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, or negligently causes the death of another
human being. (2) Criminal homicide is deliberate homicide, mitigated deliberate homicide, or
negligent homicide." MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 45-5-101 (1979). Except as provided
elsewhere in the statute, criminal homicide is deliberate homicide if "(a) it is committed pur-
posely or knowingly .... MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 45-5-102 (1979).
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sequences of his voluntary acts." 72  The jury found the defendant
guilty of deliberate homicide. In affirming his conviction, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court denied Sandstrom's contention that the pre-
sumptive intent instruction violated due process by shifting the bur-
den of proof to the defendant on an essential element of the crime. 73
The Montana court reasoned that the effect of the presumption was to
shift to the defendant only the burden of producing some evidence
that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
acts. Such a shift in the burden of production was not a violation of
the fourteenth amendment so long as the instruction did not alter the
state's burden to persuade the factfinder that the homicide was com-
mitted "purposely or knowingly." 74
The United States Supreme Court reversed, despite its recognition
that the Montana Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the presump-
tion under Montana law, and without reaching the question of the
constitutionality of a device having the production-shifting impact de-
scribed by the Montana court. Whatever the intended impact, the
Montana court was "not the final authority on the interpretation
which a jury could have given the instruction." 75  Although some
jurors may have interpreted the instruction as permissive or as having
the intended effect described by the Montana court, the possibility
that a juror might have interpreted the statute in one of two other
ways was enough to require reversal. 76  A reasonable juror might
have interpreted the instruction as a command to find intent upon
proof of a voluntary act. 77 Alternatively, a juror might have felt re-
quired to make such a finding unless the defendant proved the con-
trary by a quantum of proof far greater than "some evidence. '" 78
These possible interpretations describe, respectively, a conclusive
presumption and a mandatory presumption shifting the burden of
persuasion. Sandstrom held that either of these devices would violate
due process. 79
The pivotal concept of Sandstrom is that the possibility that the
jury reached its decision in an impermissible manner requires rever-
sal even though the jury may also have reached the same result in a
constitutionally acceptable fashion. The same analysis was used to re-
,ject an alternative theory urged by the state to salvage the constitu-
72. See 442 U.S. at 513. The Sandstrom Court observed that numerous state and lower
federal courts had held that the giving of instructions similar to the one at issue invalidated a
criminal conviction. Id. at 514.
73. State v. Sandstrom, 176 Mont. 492, __ 580 P.2d 106, 109 (1978).
74. Id. at __, 580 P.2d at 109.
75. 442 U.S. at 516-17.
76. Id. at 517.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 524.
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tionality of its presumptive intent instruction. The state argued that
when the jury was instructed that a person intends the ordinary con-
sequences of his voluntary acts, it could have interpreted "intends" to
refer only to the defendant's purpose. s0 Since deliberate homicide
could be committed purposely or knowingly, the jury could have
convicted the defendant for his knowledge without reliance on the
tainted presumption which, under this interpretation, was relevant
only to purpose. 8' The Court's response to this argument was, "[E]ven
if a jury could have ignored the presumption and found defendant
guilty because he acted knowingly, we cannot be certain that this is
what they did do." 8 2 Because criminal verdicts are general and pro-
vide no clue as to how the jury reached its decision, the mere possi-
bility that an unconstitutional means was used to arrive at the verdict
requires reversal. 83
The ultimate holdings of Allen and Sandstrom do not clash.8 4 The
primary concern of the unanimous Sandstrom Court was with the in-
struction's propensity to mislead the jury into regarding the presump-
tion as conclusive or as shifting the burden of persuasion. Had the
Sandstrom Court been satisfied that the instruction to the jury could
only be interpreted as permissive, as the Court was satisfied in Allen,
there is no indication that any constitutional defect would have re-
mained. Under Allen the inference would not have been examined on
its face for the rationality of the connection between the basic and
presumed fact so long as there was sufficient evidence to support the
verdict.8 5 In fact, Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice,
stated in a brief concurring opinion that if the Sandstrom instruction
had "'merely described a permissive inference' .. it could not conceiv-
ably have run afoul of the [Constitution]." '
80. Id. at 525. Montana juries were not provided with a definition of "'intends." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 526.
83. Id.
84. Particularly in its tacit approval of permissive inferences, Sandstrom appears to be per-
fectly harmonious with Allen. In fact, Allen is cited with approval several times in Justice Bren-
nan's opinion for the unanimous Court. Id. at 514, 519, 519-20 n.9, 526. Yet several aspects of
the Court's approach to the deductive device in Sandstrom are at odds with the Allen Court's
treatment of, for example, curative instructions, see note 206 and accompanying text infra,
sufficiency of the evidence, see note 85 and accompanying text infra, and the possibility of
error, see note 215 infra.
85. The Sandstrom Court reached its holding despite finding sufficient evidence in the rec-
ord to support the verdict, 442 U.S. at 521, because it recognized a possibility that the jury felt
compelled by the presumption to find the requisite intent merely upon proof of a voluntary act.
Id. at 525-26. In contrast, the Allen majority found the existence of sufficient evidence of pos-
session to be a reason to assume that the jury rationally applied the permitted inference. This
assumption ignores the Allen dissenters' argument that the jury may have reached its verdict by
relying on the presumption while rejecting or ignoring the evidence. See notes 210-12 and
accompanying text infra.
86. Id. at 527 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, quoting the majority opinion, id. at 514).
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Sandstrom, however, demonstrates the Court's heightened sensitiv-
ity to the way a presumptive device sounds to the ear of the juror.
This emphasis is appropriate because it is the factfinder who must
apply the presumptive device following a typically cursory instruction
as to its use, no matter how many volumes of appellate exegesis fol-
low. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: "[T]he question is not
whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has
been found by a jury according to the procedure and standards ap-
propriate for criminal trials." 8 7 But Sandstrom's fairminded concern
that presumptive devices must not mislead juries has a hollow ring in
light of the earlier Allen opinion. The concern for fairness ends with
Sandstrom's insistence on clarity so that the jury will not be misled as
to the type of inferential device involved. If the instruction to the
jury clearly conveys the concept of a permissive inference, the Allen
analysis results in an abandonment of meaningful review of the per-
missive inference except as applied. Applied review under Allen con-
sists only of a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, 8 traditionally
a minimal level of scrutiny. 89
The faith of the Allen majority seems to be that juries will weigh
independently the validity of a particular permissive inference. The
thesis pursued in this Article is that permissive inference instructions
have a substantial potential to interfere with that independent judg-
ment and thus to compromise the rationality of jury verdicts. 90 Be-
fore considering the potential impact of permissive inferences, how-
ever, the next section of the Article will examine the Allen Court's
claim that its holding follows a long line of precedents that have
drawn a sharp distinction between permissive inferences and manda-
tory presumptions. This examination will demonstrate that the Allen
majority has fabricated a revisionist history to support its novel
exemption of permissive inferences from facial review.
II. FROM TOT TO BARNES: ALLEN'S REVISIONIST HISTORY
A. Tot v. United States9'
Tot involved a statute that made it unlawful for a person who had
been convicted of a crime of violence to transport a weapon in in-
87. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1946).
88. County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, 167 (1979).
89. The standard of review for sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims is whether "any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362
(1972). This standard implies that the evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 467 (1969 &
Supp. 1978). Not surprisingly, convictions are rarely reversed on sufficiency-of-the-evidence
grounds. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 317 n.10.
90. See Part III infra.
91. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
[Vol. 33
1981] ALLEN AND SANDSTROM
terstate commerce. Possession of a weapon by a person who had been
convicted of a crime of violence was presumptive evidence that the
person had transported the weapon in interstate commerce.
92
In evaluating the deductive device, the Tot Court insisted that
there must be a "rational connection" between the basic fact and the
presumed fact, 93 and established this standard as the "controlling"
method of review of deductive devices in criminal cases. 94 Prior to
Tot, one of the tests used to determine the constitutionality of a de-
ductive device was derived from the majority opinion of Justice
Holmes in Ferry v. Ramsey, 95 a civil case. The Holmes standard,
known as "the greater includes the lesser," ignored the fact presumed
and merely questioned whether it would be constitutional to impose
liability (or culpability) on the basis of the basic fact alone. Because
the legislature had the power to make liability hinge upon proof of
the basic fact, a party found liable or a defendant found culpable
could not complain if the legislature, instead of exercising this
"greater" power, had taken the "lesser" steps of requiring the pros-
ecution to prove an additional element but allowing or requiring the
element to be found upon proof of another fact. 96 In adopting the
rational connection test, the Tot Court rejected this line of argument
without dealing with the power of its logic. 97
92. Act of June 30, 1938, ch. 850, § 2, 52 Stat. 1250 (repealed 1968), provided:
(F) It shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of vio-
lence or is a fugitive from justice to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession
of a firearm or ammunition by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that
such firearm or ammunition was shipped or transported or received, as the case
may be, by such person in violation of this Act (emphasis added).
93. 319 U.S. at 467.
94. Id.
95. 277 U.S. 88 (1928). Ferry involved suits by depositors against directors of a Kansas bank
under a state statute that made it unlawful for a director to assent to deposits with knowledge of
the bank's insolvency. Actual knowledge was not required; a director was deemed to have knowl-
edge of the bank's financial condition by virtue of his affirmative duty to be familiar with the
financial condition of the bank. Id. at 93.
96. Id. at 94.
97. The government in Tot argued that the greater includes the lesser in urging that the
constitutionality of the statutory presumption should be sustained. According to the govern-
ment, the congressional power to regulate interstate trafficking in firearms extended far enough
to permit a statute that proscribed the possession of all firearms, including those not transported
in interstate commerce, by persons convicted of crimes of violence. Since Congress had taken
the intermediate step of prohibiting only firearms transported in interstate commerce, while
making possession 'presumptive evidence" of such transportation, the presumption should be
sustained. If Congress had used its "greater power," Tot would not have had the opportunity to
exculpate himself by proving that his gun was not transported in interstate commerce. Rejecting
this line of argument, the Court stated simply that "Congress, for whatever reason, did not seek
to pronounce general prohibition of possession by certain residents of various states of
firearms ...." 319 U.S. at 472. For further discussion of the Holmes doctrine, see notes
277-80 and accompanying text infra.
Although the greater-includes-the-lesser analysis was rejected by Tot, a second standard,
"comparative convenience," was not discarded completely, but was relegated to a "corollary" of
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Tot was cited by the Allen majority as a case where a mandatory
presumption was tested for facial validity. 98 Tot clearly tested the
validity of the statutory deductive device on its face. 99  The Court,
however, took no consistent stance on the nature of the device and in
no way indicated that this factor would have the slightest bearing on
its analysis. The statute in question referred to "presumptive evi-
dence" and the Court called the device a "presumption," but in one
passage of Tot the Court indicated that the device operates only as a
permissive inference: "[T]he statute in question . . . leaves the jury
free to act on the presumption alone once the specific facts are
proved." 100 A paragraph later, however, the Court's description of
how the deductive device operates sounds like a mandatory presump-
tion: "If the presumption warrants conviction unless the defendant
comes forward with evidence in explanation [permissive inference be-
cause conviction is warranted but not required?] and if, as is necessar-
ily true, such evidence must be credited by the jury if the presump-
tion is to be rebutted [mandatory presumption shifting the burden of
persuasion?] .... "101 The instructions to the jury, 102 also ambigu-
the "controlling" rational connection test. 319 U.S. at 467. See also note 189 infra. The com-
parative convenience test had been enunciated by Justice Cardozo a decade before Tot in Mor-
rison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). Like the greater-includes-the-lesser standard, the com-
parative convenience test was not concerned with the inferential relationship between the parts
of a deductive device. Under this test, a deductive device would be allowed if it was "fair" to
permit the state to bolster its case with such a device because of a "manifest disparity in con-
venience of proof and opportunity for knowledge." Id. at 91. The reduction of comparative
convenience to a "corollary" in Tot seemed to be based upon the difficulty of placing limits on
the doctrine. 319 U.S. at 469-70.
98. County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-59 (1979).
99. The Court examined various state laws and found that some states had gun registration
laws and some did not. The Court added that
[alside from the fact that a number of states have no such laws, there is no pre-
sumption that a firearm must have been lawfully acquired or that it was not trans-
ferred interstate prior to the adoption of state regulation. Even less basis exists for
the inference from mere possession that acquisition occurred subsequent to the ef-
fective date of the statute [15 U.S.C. § 902()] July [June] 30, 1938.
319 U.S. at 468. It was noted that the federal statute also referred to possession of ammunition
but no state law addressed that issue. Based on these general considerations, the Court con-
cluded that the statutory device failed the rational connection test. Id. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court made no reference to the particular facts in Tot's case.
100. 319 U.S. at 469 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 470.
102. The trial judge instructed as follows:
[O]rdinarily there would be no presumption similar to the one in this case. The
burden is on the United States, as I stated, to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt; that burden does not shift. But by such, if there is a presumption that this
gun having been found in the possession of the defendant was transported or ship-
ped in interstate or foreign commerce, if you find that he obtained the same sub-
sequent to June the 30th 1938 [the effective date of the legislation].
Record at 41, Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The first two sentences convey the
thought that the presumptive device does not shift the burden of persuasion. The third sen-
tence is incomprehensible. The Tot trial court also put the following question to the jury: "Does
the testimony which has been offered on behalf of the defendant . . . meet that presumption
and cause you to have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the gun was transported or
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ous, were not even mentioned in the Tot opinion, although jury in-
structions are a crucial indicator of how a deductive device operates.
Neither the jury instructions nor the Court's discussion, therefore,
established the nature of the statutory device in question. Whatever
type of deductive device was involved in Tot, it is apparent that the
Court did not regard that question as a threshold requirement that
determined the nature and quantum of evidence used in deciding
whether the "rational connection" test had been met.
B. United States v. Gainey' 03
It was more than twenty years before the Supreme Court issued
another major decision on the validity of a deductive device. The
Court still used the rational connection analysis of Tot in its 1965
decision in United States v. Gainey and again the following term in
United States v. Roinano.10 4 The two cases provide an interesting
insight into the application of the rational connection test since the
Gainey device was upheld and the Romano device was declared un-
constitutional, although both involved similar deductive devices em-
bodied in companion statutes in the Internal Revenue Code. 10 5
The statutory device in Gainey provided that proof of presence at
an illegal still "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize con-
viction" for the offense of "carrying on" the business of an illegal still
unless the defendant satisfactorily explained his presence at the
still. 10 6  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had reversed
shipped in interstate or foreign commerce?" Id. at 41-42. This passage again confirms that there
is no shift in the burden of persuasion since the defendant need only raise a "reasonable doubt."
The query as to whether the defendant's evidence meets the presumption suggests a mandatory
presumption shifting the burden of production. However, since Tot had presented evidence, see
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 465 (1943), perhaps the trial judge meant only that the jury
should consider evidence offered by the defense in deciding whether to accept a permissive
inference.
103. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
104. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
105. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(4) (1976) and 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b) (1976), construed in
Gainey, 380 U.S. at 65, with 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1) (1976) and Act of September 2, 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-859, § 201, 72 Stat. 1398 (repealed in 1976), construed in Romano, 382 U.S. at 144.
See also notes 120-25 and accompanying text infra.
106. Act of September 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-859, § 201, 72 Stat. 1398 [current version at
26 U.S.C. § 5601(b) (1976)]. Gainey had also been convicted of violating 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1)
(1976) (possession, custody or control of a set up, unregistered still and distilling apparatus).
See 380 U.S. at 64. Conviction under this section also was "authorized" upon proof of presence
at the still. Act of September 2, Pub. L. No. 85-859, § 201, 72 Stat. 1398 (repealed 1976). This
statutory device was not reviewed in Gainey, but it was examined and declared unconstitutional
in Romano the following term. See notes 120-25 and accompanying text infra. The device was
not reviewed by the Gainey Court because Gainey had been given concurrent sentences and
the Court found the conviction under § 5601(a)(4) to be valid. 380 U.S. at 65. Under the
concurrent sentence doctrine adhered to by the Court, a reviewing court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a conviction or sentence if the sentence was concurrent to a
valid sentence. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943). The concurrent sen-
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Gainey's convictions on appeal because the statutory device lacked a
rational connection between the basic and presumed facts. 10 7  The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals was cor-
rect in applying the Tot rational connection test, but differing with
the result reached by the circuit court. 108
Writing for the seven-man majority, 10 9 Justice Stewart advocated
greater deference to "the capacity of Congress to amass the stuff of
actual experience and cull conclusions from it." 110 The rationality of
the statutory "inference," as Justice Stewart consistently referred to
it, was viewed "in the context of the broad substantive offense it sup-
ports.""' The statutory section in question described the extremely
comprehensive offense of "carrying on" the enterprise of an illegal
distillery. Justice Stewart pointed out that previous prosecutions
under the statute had brought within its sweep "[siuppliers, haulers,
and a host of other functionaries" as well as those who merely aid and
abet the operation. 112 Since even minor functionaries are helping to
"carry on" an illegal distillery and since, as "Congress was undoubt-
ably aware," stills are usually located in secluded areas where strang-
ers to the illegal business are unlikely to be found, the connection
between presence at the still and carrying on a distillery was found
rational. 113
This analysis of the validity of the statutory "inference" is clearly
facial. The Gainey Court never mentioned the specific facts of the
case in the body of the opinion, relegating them to a footnote."14
The history of past prosecutions under the statute, the folklore and
Congressional findings of the secluded location of stills, and the broad
array of functionaries brought within the sweep of the statute are all
general considerations. Gainey thus fails to support the analytical
framework of Allen. The Gainey Court did emphasize the permissive
nature of the statutory device in question, but if the Allen thesis were
correct, the Gainey inference should have been tested by reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial. The focus in Gainey,
however, was on stereotyped facts and not the particular facts of the
case.
tence doctrine was reduced from a jurisdictional rule to one of judicial convenience in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787-91 (1969).
107. Barrett v. United States, 322 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963).
108. 380 U.S. at 66-68.
109. Justice Black dissented, 380 U.S. at 74-88, and Justice Douglas dissented in part, id. at
71-74.
110. Id. at 67.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113, Id. at 67-68.
114. Gainey was driving an old Dodge truck with darkened headlights to the site of a se-
cluded still hidden in a swamp in Dooley County, Georgia. Government agents apprehended
him after a brief chase. Id. at 64 n. 1.
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Unlike the trial judge in Tot and in several of the other cases that
will be considered, the trial judge in Gainey made a concerted effort
in his instructions to the jury to place the statutory "inference" in
perspective in order to protect against its coercive impact on the
jury. 115 In characterizing the deductive device as permissive, the
Gainey majority pointed to the permissive nature of these instruc-
tions. 116 The Court's purpose in doing so was not, as Allen
suggested, to determine the quantum or type of evidence that would
be considered to satisfy the rational connection test. The Court had
already concluded, several paragraphs before, that the statutory "in-
ference" satisfied the Tot standard. 117 The Gainey majority em-
phasized the permissive nature of the instructions to counter the
argument of the dissent that the judge's instructions placed undue
emphasis on the defendant's decision not to take the stand." 18
C. United States v. Romano 119
United States v. Romano dealt with a statutory deductive device
almost identical to the one in Gainey.'20 In Romano, however, the
115. Id. at 69-70. Despite the unusual efforts of the trial judge in this case, his statements
that "bare presence ...is not in and of itself enough to make him guilty" and that presence is
only "a circumstance to be considered along with other circumstances in the case" were con-
tradicted when the judge explained that the statute provides that proof of presence "shall he
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction." Furthermore, if the Gainey charge was
considered in light of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the phrase "unless the
defendant by the evidence in the case and by proven facts and circumstances explains such
presence to the satisfaction of the jury," 380 U.S. at 70, might well be found unconstitutional. A
reasonable juror could interpret this language to mean that the defendant must produce evi-
dence and that the evidence must do more than raise a reasonable doubt. With Sandstrom's
heightened sensitivity to such possibilities, see notes 75-83 and accompanying text supra, the
Gainey instruction now might be found unconstitutional since it reasonably could be interpreted
as shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
116. 380 U.S. at 70-71.
117. Id. at 68.
118. Justice Douglas argued in dissent that the instruction, "unless the defendant by the
evidence in the case and by the proven facts and circumstances explains such presence to the
satisfaction of the jury," constituted an impermissible comment on a defendant's failure to tes-
tify. 380 U.S. at 74. The Gainey majority did suggest that the "better practice would be to
instruct the jurors that they may draw the inference unless the evidence in the case provides a
satisfactory explanation for the defendant's presence at the still . (emphasis added). Id. at 71
n.7.
119. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1) (1976) provides that any person who "has in his possession or
custody, or under his control, any still or distilling apparatus set up which is not registered, as
required by section 5179(a) ... shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than 5 years, or both ..... Act of September 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-859, § 201, 72 Stat.
1398 (repealed 1976), provided that:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a)(1) the defendant is shown to have
been at the site or place where, and at the time when, a still or distilling apparatus
was set up without having been registered, such presence of the defendant shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains
such presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court when tried without
jury).
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same basic fact, presence at an illegal still, "authorized" a narrower
finding of presumed fact, "possession, custody and . . . control" of an
illegal still.121 In his opinion for a unanimous Court,122 Justice
White pointed out that this narrower presumption made the Romano
case "markedly different" 123 fiom Gainey. Without reference to the
specific facts of the case, the Court concluded:
Presence at an operating still is sufficient evidence to prove the charge of
"carrying on" because anyone present at the site is very probably con-
nected with the illegal enterprise. . . . But presence tells us nothing about
what the defendant's specific function was and carries no legitimate, ra-
tional or reasonable inference that he was engaged in one of the
specialized functions connected with possession, rather than in one of the
supply, delivery or operational activities having nothing to do with posses-
sion. . . . [A]bsent some showing of the defendant's function at the still, its
connection with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference
of guilt--"the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbi-
trarv. ... 124
The only discussion of the evidence was the Court's statement that if
the question before it "had been the sufficiency of the evidence . . .
[the] conviction would [have been] sustained." 125
The Romnano Court commented only briefly on the jury instruc-
tions, referring specifically to the instruction that presence at the still
"shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction." Ac-
cording to the Court, "[t]his latter instruction may have been given
considerable weight by the jury; the jury may have disbelieved or
disregarded the other evidence of possession and convicted these de-
fendants on the evidence of presence alone." 126
Does this passage mean, as Allen suggests, that the Court regarded
the statutory device as a mandatory presumption and for this reason
considered its facial validity? Surely if the distinction between man-
datory and permissive was of controlling importance, the Romano
Court would have elaborated on this point instead of making such an
oblique reference. Instead, as was true of Tot and Gainey, the Court
was preoccupied by the rationality of finding the presumed fact from
the basic fact without regard to the type of deductive device or the
particular facts of the case. Furthermore, the quoted passage from
Romano speaks only to the fact that the jury may have relied on the
instruction and disregarded the evidence. Not only does this not
sound like mandatory language, it simply recognizes a danger inher-
121. 382 U.S. at 140.
122. Justices Black and Douglas concurred on the basis of their dissents in Gainey and Justice
Fortas concurred without opinion. 382 U.S. at 144.
123. Id. at 140.
124. Id. at 141 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 138.
126. Id. at 138-39 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 33
ALLEN AND SANDSTROM
ent in permissive inferences. As the dissent in Allen pointed out,
since the jury is told that it is permissible to rely on an inference to
establish an element of the offense, there is no way of knowing
whether this is the means by which the verdict was reached. 127  For
this reason, Romano examined the statutory device on its face despite
the existence of sufficient evidence in the record. Romano, like
Sandstrom, was sensitive to the possibility of error and the principle
that if there are alternative theories by which the jury could have
reached its verdict, the unconstitutionality of any of the theories re-
quires that the conviction be set aside. 128
D. Leary v. United States'2 9
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions
of well-known Harvard professor Dr. Timothy Leary. Leary had been
convicted under two federal statutes governing traffic in marihuana,
and his convictions had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.130  After reversing one of Leary's convictions for failing
to pay a marihuana transfer tax, 13 1 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a statutory presumption that underlay the second
conviction. The statute provided criminal penalties for any person
who
knowingly, with intent to defraud the United States, imports or brings into
the United States marihuana contrary to law . . . , or receives, conceals,
buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or
sale of such marihuana after being imported or brought in, knowing the
same to have been imported or brought into the United States contrary to
law. 132
Another provision of the statute established that possession of
marihuana was sufficient to authorize conviction unless the defendant
explained the possession to the satisfaction of the jury. 133
127. 442 U.S. at 175 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also notes 206-12 and accompanying text
infra.
128. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979) (citing Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 31-32 (1969); County Ct. of Ulster County
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 159-60 n.17, 175-76 (Powell, J., dissenting) (1979); Bachellar v. Mary-
land, 397 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1970); United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. United
States, 330 U.S. 395, 408-09 (1947); Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 611-14 (1946)).
129. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
130. 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967).
131. 395 U.S. at 12-29. The Marihuana Tax Act, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 560 (1954) (repealed
1970), was declared unconstitutional since compliance with the tax statutes would expose Leary
to a "'real and appreciable' risk of self-incrimination." 395 U.S. at 16 (citing Grosso v. United
States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)).
132. Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, § 106, 70 Stat. 570 (repealed 1970).
133. Id. Thus, upon proof of possession the jury was "authorized" by the statutory device to
find "(1) that the marihuana was imported or brought into the United States illegally; . . . (2)
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In an opinion by Justice Harlan for a unanimous Court, the pre-
sumption was found to violate due process because of a lack of ra-
tional connection between possession and the defendant's knowledge
of unlawful importation.' 34 The Court found it unnecessary to reach
the question whether a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was re-
quired in a criminal case where the presumed fact was an essential
element of the crime, since the Leary presumption did not pass the
more-likely-than-not standard.' 35 The Court acknowledged -the def-
erence shown by Gainey for the empirical judgments of Congress. 136
The Court was far less deferential to Congress than it had been in
Gainey, however. The Court stated that the "legislative record does
not supply an adequate basis" to test the statutory device and that it
would not limit itself to data available at the time of the statute's
enactment in 1956.1 37 Further defining the rational connection test,
Justice Harlan stated that it was necessary to find with "substantial
assurance that at least a majority of marihuana possessors have
learned of the foreign origin of their marihuana" before the presump-
that the defendant knew of the unlawful importation;" and (3) that the importation was done
with intent to defraud the United States. See 395 U.S. at 37 & n.65. Leary had not attacked the
rationality of the third presumed fact in his Petition for Certiorari. For this reason, the Court
did not consider the rationality of finding a presumed intent to defraud from proof of presence.
The Court also did not directly reach the validity of the first presumed fact, illegal importation,
because of the Court's conclusion that possession was insufficiently probative of the second
presumed fact, knowledge of unlawful importation. See id. at 37 n.65. However, "in view of the
paucity of direct evidence as to the beliefs of marihuana smokers generally about the source- of
their marihuana," the Court considered the level of imported marihuana in the United States as
a first step in its analysis of the question of knowledge of importation. Id. at 39. The Court
concluded that the data surveyed warranted the conclusion "that most domestically consumed
marihuana comes from abroad." Id. at 44.
134. Before reaching this conclusion, the Court disposed of the government's contention that
it was unnecessary to assess the validity of the deductive device because Leary's own testimony
provided a sufficient basis for conviction. Id. at 31-32. Leary had testified that he had obtained
the marihuana in New York and had taken it with him on an intended vacation to Mexico. Id. at
30. After crossing the International Bridge between the United States and Mexico at Laredo, Texas,
Leary was apparently denied entry by Mexican customs officials. Id. at 10. The marihuana
in his possession was discovered by an American customs agent upon Leary's return to the
United States. Id. The Government argued that the jury could have convicted Leary based on
his own admission that he had brought marihuana into the United States from Mexico. The
Court reached the issue of facial validity of the deductive device even though it acknowledged
that the jury's verdict might have been based on Leary's testimony, stating: "It has long been
settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the unconstitutionality
of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside." Id. at 31-32. See note 128
supra and the cases cited therein.
135. 395 U.S. at 36 n.64.
136. Id. at 38 (citing United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965)).
137. 395 U.S. at 38. The Court also noted that "a statute based on a legislative declaration of
facts is subject to constitutional attack on the ground that the facts no longer exist." Id. at 38
n.68 (citations omitted). Leary had presented evidence at his trial that "marihuana will grow
anywhere in the United States and that some actually is grown here." Id. at 37. His attempt to
introduce further evidence on the amount of domestically grown marihuana was rebuffed by the
trial court as irrelevant. Id. at 37 n.66.
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tion could be sustained. 138  Justice Harlan proceeded to cull in-
formation on his own from a lengthy list of books, studies, and gov-
ernment reports that demonstrated that there is a likelihood that a
significant percentage of domestically consumed marihuana is grown
in the United States. After reviewing these materials, the Court an-
nounced that it was unable "to estimate even roughly the proportion
of marihuana possessors who have learned . . . the origin of their
marihuana," and the presumption was declared invalid. 139 The
Court's extensive survey of the literature concerning marihuana use,
traffic, and customs, its discussion about whether a majority of users
know of the drug's origin, and its resolute refusal to consider the facts
of the case (including whether the defendant, who had just returned
from Mexico, might know better than a majority of users the origin of
the marihuana that he possessed) all demonstrate convincingly that
the deductive device was tested on its face.
It is again less clear what type of deductive device was construed.
Although Justice Harlan usually referred to the device in question as
a "presumption," 140 he made no mention of the jury's freedom to
reject it or duty to follow it. The lack of any explicit discussion of the
type of deductive device makes it unlikely that this could have been
regarded as a crucial threshold question determining the method of
review, as Allen suggests. 14 1 The instructions to the jury, which
were only briefly noted by the Leary Court,14 2 are not helpful in
determining the type of device since they merely track or paraphrase
the language of the statute. The key words of the statute are the same
as in Gainey and Romano, including the pivotal word "authorize" and
the concluding words "unless the defendant explains to the satis-
faction of the jury." 143 The use of "authorize" does not make the
mandatory nature of the presumption self-evident since the ordinary
definition of "authorize" denotes a power to act, rather than a com-
mand. 144
Assuming that the Allen Court was correct in labeling the deduc-
tive device in Leary as a mandatory presumption, the decision does
not support Allen. As a presumption, the device should be tested
facially according to Allen, and Leary clearly involves this type of
analysis. But all of the devices in the cases discussed thus far were
examined facially, and no distinction was made based upon the type
138. Id. at 52.
139. Id.
140. At one point, Justice Harlan referred to the "presumption to permit an inference of
knowledge." Id. at 32 n.55.
141. See County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 156.
142. 395 U.S. at 31 n.52; see Appendix of Record 97a-98a, 103a-104a.
143. See notes 106-20 and accompanying text supra.
144. Webster's New International Dictionary 146-47 (unabridged) (Merriam-Webster 1976)
defines "authorize" as follows: "to endorse, empower, or permit by or as if by some recognized
or proper authority .. .: sanction .. . : justify."
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of deductive device involved. Allen breaks new ground in exempting
permissive inferences from facial review, an innovation that finds no
support in the cases cited by the Allen majority.
E. Turner v. United States 145
One term after Leary, the Supreme Court considered two statutory
deductive devices contained in different sections of the federal nar-
cotics laws. Because the defendant in Turner v. United States was
found to have both heroin and cocaine in his possession, the case
required the Court to wade through an extensive literature concern-
ing traffic and use of these drugs in a similar fashion to the foray of
the Leary Court into the folkways of marihuana use.
Turner was convicted on two counts of receiving, concealing, or
facilitating the transportation or concealment of narcotic drugs known
to have been illegally imported. One count was based upon the her-
oin and one count based upon the cocaine that Turner possessed. 146
The statute used a deductive device with wording similar to that of
the statutes involved in Leary, Romano, and Gainey to authorize
conviction upon proof of possession unless the defendant satisfactorily
explained his possession. 1 47  The Court upheld the validity of the
deductive device as it related to Turner's possession of heroin be-
cause no heroin is made in the United States. 148 The device was
found invalid as it related to cocaine since large quantities of cocaine
are produced in this country, and Turner's conviction on this count
was reversed. 149
The Allen majority labeled the device a mandatory presumption 150
despite the fact that Turner stated that the jury was informed that the
145. 396 U.S. 398 (1969).
146. The statute under which Turner was convicted provided in part that:
whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into the
United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or
receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, con-
cealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported or brought in,
knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the United States con-
trary to law, or conspires to commit any of such acts in violation of the laws of the
United States, shall be imprisoned ....
Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, § 105, 70 Stat. 570 (repealed 1970).
147. The statute provided: "Whenever on trial for a violation of this subsection the defendant
is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession
to the satisfaction of the jury." Id. At trial, the government alleged "that Turner had knowingly
possessed heroin" and cocaine. 396 U.S. at 405. The government relied on the statutory device
quoted above to establish (1) knowingly receiving, concealing, and transporting heroin [cocaine
in the other count under the statute] which (2) was illegally imported and which (3) he knew
was illegally imported. Id.
148. Id. at 415-16.
149. Id. at 418-19.
150. County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, 158, 161 (1979).
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statute did not require the jury to convict once possession was estab-
lished.15l The Allen majority ignored this clear indication that the
Court perceived the deductive device to be permissive because if the
Turner statute were regarded as a permissive inference, then the
statutory devices with virtually identical wording in Romano and
Leary would also be permissive. But Romano and Leary clearly
tested the deductive devices facially. If it were admitted, in light of
Turner, that the devices in Romano and Leary were regarded as
permissive inferences, insofar as the Court was concerned with the
question at all, the pretense of Allen evolving from a line of prece-
dents would be undermined.
The irony of Allen's categorization of this device as a mandatory
presumption despite the explicit finding to the contrary is that the
Turner Court's rational connection analysis contains a suggestion of
applied review. 152 Had the Allen majority accepted the Turner
Court's categorization of the device as permissive, therefore, there
would have been a colorable claim of some support for Allen's
151. The Court stated that
[t]he trial judge . . . instructed the jury-as § 174 permits but does not
require-that possession of a narcotic drug is sufficient evidence to justify convic-
tion of the crime defined in § 174.
The jury, however, even if it believed Turner had possessed heroin, was not
required by the instructions to find him guilty. . . . The jury was obligated by its
instructions to assess for itself the probative force of possession and the weight, if
any, to be accorded the statutory inference.
396 U.S. at 405-07.
152. The highly empirical general inquiry supported by references to numerous hearings,
studies, and findings of congressional committees and executive departments used by the Court
in Turner is strongly reminiscent of Leary. The discussion undertaken by the Court included
such topics as the amount of heroin imported, 396 U.S. at 409-16, the possibilities of domestic
cultivation of opium poppies from which heroin is made, id. at 412, 413, and the likelihood of
synthetic manufacture of heroin from codeine and morphine, id. at 413-16. All of this is clearly
a general inquiry divorced from the particular facts of the Turner case-what the Allen Court
called facial review. But Turner's analysis of the connection between the basic fact of possession
of heroin and knowledge of the imported nature of the substance is not so completely facial.
The Court stated that "[i]t may be that the ordinary jury would not always know that heroin
illegally circulating in this country is not manufactured here. But Turner and others who sell or
distribute heroin are in a class apart." Id. at 416. The characterization of Turner as seller or
distributor was based on the fact that the defendant possessed the heroin in 275 individually
packaged glassine bags. Id. at 415, 416 n.30. This reliance on facts keyed to Turner's individual
situation led one commentator to conclude that the Court had compromised its practice of an
abstract rational connection analysis. See Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences:
The Value of Complexity, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1187, 1208 (1979).
This conclusion is tenable, but the reference to the facts of Turner can also be seen simply as
a non sequitur. Following the remarks concerning Turner as a member of a "class apart," the
Court reached the general conclusion that "those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become
aware that the product that they deal in is smuggled." 396 U.S. at 417. The Court's conclusion
included a discussion of how "users and addicts" inevitably become aware of the source of their
heroin, id. at 417 n.33, despite the fact that there was no evidence that Turner was either a
user or an addict. This further finding would have been unnecessary if the Court's holding
depended on Turner's status. Since the Court found the deductive device rational for sellers,
distributors, users, and addicts, and since it is hard to imagine anyone trafficking in heroin who
is not a member of one of these categories, the analysis is arguably facial despite the reference
to Turner's status.
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framework of applied review of permissive inferences. The Allen
majority apparently ignored Turner's rare explicit statement of per-
missiveness because of its desire to cloak its analysis with the mantle
of stare decisis.
Turner was also convicted on two counts of violating a statute that
made it unlawful to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotic
drugs except in their original stamped packages, 153 one count again
based on the heroin found in his possession and one count on the
cocaine. The second statute provided that "the absence of appropriate
taxpaid stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a
violation of this subsection by the person in whose possession the
same may be found."1 54
The Allen majority categorized this deductive device as a permis-
sive inference. 155 The Turner Court did not discuss the impact of
the device but referred to it as a "presumption" five times, 156 twice
called it a "statutory inference,' 57 and twice said that it "authorize[s]
an inference." 158 The trial judge read the statute to the jury without
elaboration or explanation of "prima facie." 159 The term prima facie
is synonymous with "sufficient" in law.' 60 Since the statute stated
that possession of narcotic drugs "shall be prima facie [or sufficient]
evidence," the device appears to be mandatory. Unlike the first stat-
ute in Turner, there is no mere authorization for the jury to regard it
as sufficient.
The Allen majority apparently classified the statute as a permissive
inference without a discernible basis for doing so because the Turner
153. The Narcotic Drugs Tax Act, ch. 736, § 4704, 68A Stat. 550 (1954) (repealed 1970).
154. Id.
155. County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
156. 396 U.S. at 421, 422, 423, 424.
157. Id. at 421, 423.
158. Id. at 400, 421.
159. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1969), Record at 18, 24. The question of how the
jury would interpret the statute is puzzling since prima facie evidence is hardly a household
term. If a juror were familiar with the term, it is reasonable to suppose that he would interpret
it as meaning "sufficient," since both legal and standard dictionaries define it in this way, see,
e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1800 (unabridged) (Merriam-
Webster 1976) ("prima facie: at first view; on the first appearance; prima facie: 1) based on
immediate impression, apparent; prima facie evidence: evidence sufficient in law to raise a
presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted"); BLACK'S LAw DicrnoN-
ARY 1071 (5th ed. 1979) ("[e]vidence good and sufficient on its face; such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or a group or chain of facts constitut-
ing the party's claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain suffi-
cient .... ).
One commentator has suggested that the jury's unfamiliarity with the term prima facie makes
its use preferable to use of a word such as presumption, which a juror will more likely interpret
according to his independent understanding. Soules, Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20
BAYLOR L. REV. No. 3, 275, 290, 291 (1968). Soules argued that unfamiliarity is a virtue be-
cause the jury would be more attentive to the definition which would be provided. Soules also
suggested that in common usage, "the verb presumed is understood to mean conclusively pre-
sumed." Id. at 290.
160. See note 159 supra.
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Court's analysis of this statute contains a suggestion of applied review.
Turner's indictment charged him with possessing heroin as well as
purchasing, dispensing, and distributing heroin. Possession was not a
culpable act under the statute although selling was. Selling was also
mistakenly omitted from the instructions to the jury and replaced
with possessing. 6' Thus, as read to the jury, the literal instructions
seemed to allow the jury to find the illegal presumed fact, possession
of heroin, from proof of the basic fact, also possession of heroin.
The error was held harmless. Justice White reasoned that the jury
must have believed the evidence on possession in order to have
found Turner guilty of any of the prohibited activities-purchasing,
dispensing, or distributing heroin in unmarked packages-with which
he was charged under Count 2: "Since the only evidence of a viola-
tion involving heroin was Turner's possession of the drug, the jury to
convict must have believed this evidence." 162 Justice White stated
that the packaging of the heroin in individual glassine envelopes was
an "indivisible" part of the possession evidence 163 and found that the
individual packaging provided solid evidence of distribution. 164
Postulating in this part of the analysis that the jury did not use the
deductive device at all, Justice White concluded that "the instruction
on the presumption is beside the point, since even if invalid, it was
harmless error." 165
Even making. the dubious assumptions that the Turner Court re-
garded the "prima facie" language of the statute as a permissive infer-
ence and that this finding was a crucial, albeit unarticulated, pre-
requisite to the harmless error holding, Turner provides little support
for the Allen majority. Justice White did not stop with the harmless
error analysis but went on to evaluate the deductive device on the
161. 396 U.S. at 421 n.41.
162. Id. at 420.
163. Justice White's belief in the indivisibility of the evidence is not entirely justified. The
jury could have accepted evidence showing possession but rejected that part of the evidence
that showed how the heroin was packaged. The analysis of the Allen majority on a similar point
is similarly flawed. See notes 209-10 and accompanying text infra.
164. 396 U.S. at 420.
Turner was also convicted of a second count under this same statute based upon cocaine in an
unstamped tinfoil package found in his possession. But the cocaine was in a sugar mixture
amounting to a single package of 14.68 grams. Id. at 401. By contrast to the 48.25 grams of
individually packaged heroin discovered in Turner's possession, the single package of only 14
grams of cocaine in a sugar mixture did not "so surely demonstrate that Turner was in the
process of distributing." Id. at 423. The statutory device was declared invalid as to cocaine.
Cocaine is legally manufactured in this country (unlike heroin) and amounts sufficient to invali-
date the § 174 inference are stolen from legal channels. Id. See also note 152 supra. Justice
White reasoned that "[t]he thief who steals cocaine very probably obtains it from a stamped
package." 396 U.S. at 423. The analysis of the statute with respect to the cocaine count, like the
alternative holding for the heroin conviction, clearly uses the language of facial review. Accord-
ing to Allen, facial examination marks the review of a mandatory presumption. But if this statu-
tory device is mandatory, Turner's harmless error analysis for the identically worded device for
heroin can provide no support for Allen's theory of applied review of a permissive inference.
165. Id. at 421.
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alternative supposition that evidence of possession was not in itself
sufficient proof of distributing heroin. The Turner Court stated that
the deductive device "would assume critical importance" based on
this supposition. 166 The Court held that, although the "bare fact" of
possession was far short of "sufficient evidence" to prove dispensing,
distributing, or selling if that had been charged, Turner's conviction
would still be affirmed because possession was sufficiently probative
of purchasing. 16 7 Justice White found that "most users may be pre-
sumed to purchase what they use" even granting that "perhaps a few
acquire it by gift and some heroin undoubtedly is stolen." 168 Refer-
ences to the "bare fact" of possession, the discussion of "most users,"
and the discussion of the various hypothetical means of obtaining her-
oin is the language of facial validity.
The primary holding may be the harmless error analysis and the
facial examination of the statutory device an alternative ground, but
the first finding is premised on the assumption that the jury did not
use the deductive device at all in order to find possession. Although
the Allen dissenters criticized the majority for using "an unarticulated
harmless error standard," 169 the Allen majority's thesis was far differ-
ent from the harmless error analysis in Turner.
Allen seems to have assumed not only use of the inference by the
jury but also use of the inference in light of the evidence adduced at
trial. 170 In the absence of an assumption of non-use, the Turner
Court found it necessary to undertake a facial analysis of the inference
despite the existence of sufficient evidence in the record. The Allen
majority started at the other end by finding the existence of sufficient
evidence to support the conviction as the basis for not examining a
permissive inference on its face.
F. Barnes v. United States 171
Prior to Allen and Sandstrom, the last major decision by the Su-
preme Court involving a deductive device in a criminal case was
Barnes v. United States. Unlike the other cases that have been
considered, Barnes involved a common-law rather than a statutory
deductive device, a distinction that made no difference in the Court's
method of analysis. 172  Justice Powell's majority opinion again found
166. Id.
167. Id. at 421-22.
168. Id. at 422. The possibility that heroin could be purchased, found, or otherwise obtained
in a stamped package was discounted since it was "'unlikely that a package containing heroin
would ever be legally stamped." Id. at 421.
169. County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 177 (Powell, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 166 n.29.
171. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
172. Id. at 845 n.8. The Court held that the rational connection test was also applicable to
common-law deductive devices although such devices presented fewer constitutional problems
since they were invoked "only in the discretion of the trial judge." Id.
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it unnecessary to decide whether the required connection between
basic and presumed facts must satisfy a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
requirement since the device in Barnes met the reasonable doubt
standard. 173
The device in Barnes allowed a finding of knowledge that property
was stolen from proof of the defendant's unexplained possession of the
property. Justice Powell consistently referred to the device as an in-
ference, and the Allen Court also categorized the device in Barnes as
a permissive inference. It appears that this is a proper categorization,
since the jury was told that it was "never required to make this infer-
ence." 174 The crucial question is therefore how the inference was
analyzed. 175
173. Id. at 846.
174. Id. at 840 n.3. Compared to most of the others that have been considered, the instruc-
tions in Barnes were a model of clarity:
Possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a
circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the
light of surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the
person in possession knew the property had been stolen.
However, you are never required to make this inference. It is the exclusive prov-
ince of the jury to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the
evidence in this case warrant any inference which the law permits the jury to draw
from the possession of recently stolen property ...
If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that
the mail described in the indictment was stolen, and that while recently stolen the
contents of said mail here, the four United States Treasury checks, were in the
possession of the defendant you would ordinarily be justified in drawing from those
facts the inference that the contents were possessed by the accused with knowledge
that it was stolen property, unless such possession is explained by facts and cir-
cumstances in this case which are in some way consistent with the defendant's inno-
cence.
Id.
A single passage in a footnote casts doubt on the reasonable assumption that the Barnes
majority correctly conceived of the device as a permissive inference:
It is true that the practical effect of instructing the jury on the inference arising
from unexplained possession of recently stolen property is to shift the burden of
going forward with evidence to the defendant. If the Government proves possession
and nothing more, this evidence remains unexplained unless the defendant intro-
duces evidence, since ordinarily the Government's evidence will not provide an
explanation of his possession consistent with innocence. In Tot v. United States, 319
U.S. 463 (1943), the Court stated that the burden of going forward may not be
freely shifted to the defendant. See also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 44-45
(1969). Tot held, however, that where there is a "rational connection" between the
facts proved and the fact presumed or inferred, it is permissible to shift the burden
of going forward to the defendant. Where an inference satisfies the reasonable-
doubt standard, as in the present case, there will certainly be a rational connection
between the fact presumed or inferred (in this case, knowledge) and the facts the
Government must prove in order to shift the burden of going forward (possession of
recently stolen property).
Id. at 846 n.ll. Does the Court mean that this common-law device actually shifts the burden of
production upon proof of the basic fact as the last three sentences of the footnote suggest, or
does the "inference" only cause that practical effect, as the first part of the footnote suggests?
Given the primacy of the word practical in the first line, the relatively clear jury instructions in
this case, and the Court's consistent references to an inference, the latter seems more likelv.
But either way, this language presents difficulties for the Allen analysis. If in fact the Court
means that the common-law "device" shifts the burden of production, the "inference" is actually
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The Barnes opinion began with a brief review of the development
and application of the rational connection test to review deductive
devices in Tot, Gainey, Romano, Turner, and Leary.176  The Court's
focus was on the development of the standard of proof required to
connect basic and presumed facts. No reference was made to a
permissive/mandatory distinction; rather, the Court was preoccupied
with the concepts of "rational connection," "more likely than not,"
and "reasonable doubt." 177
Following this legal review, the Barnes majority amassed citations
from "centuries" of use of the inference of guilty knowledge from
unexplained possession of stolen goods. The "longstanding and consis-
tent judicial approval" reflected "accumulated common experience"
and provided a "strong indication that the instruction comports with
due process." 178 The reference to centuries of common-law use is
a mandatory presumption contrary to the Allen categorization. But if the discussion is of the
effect of a permissive inference, Allen is also undermined since the language employed is the
effect of the device in general, and not of its operation in the particular case.
Moreover, the very ambiguity of the language in the footnote suggests that the Barnes Court
was not conscious of a mandatory/permissive dichotomy. An "actual" shift in the burden of
production or persuasion is what distinguishes a mandatory presumption from a permissive in-
ference. If this distinction made as dramatic a difference to the method of analysis as Allen
claims, surely the discussion would have clarified whether the Court intended "shift" to refer to
only the practical necessity of coming forward with rebutting testimony or to an actual shift. The
fact that the Barnes opinion was written by Justice Powell, who rejected the mandatory/
permissive dichotomy in his dissent in Allen, makes it even more unlikely that the analysis in
Barnes was guided by the principles discerned in it by the Allen majority.
175. The Barnes opinion acknowledged the coercive impact of permissive inferences that
Allen totally denied. See 412 U.S. at 846 n.ll. Barnes recognized that even if the government
proves only the basic fact of possession, the practical effect of the inference is to influence the
defendant to produce an explanation of his possession, "since ordinarily the Government's evi-
dence will not provide an explanation . . . consistent with innocence." Id. The Court seems to
have been comfortable allowing this inference to operate only because the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard was met in Barnes. In fact, based on this passage and others of a
similar sentiment in the cases that have been considered here, several commentators have
suggested that either the Court was moving to, or had already reached sub silentio, the conclu-
sion that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was required to satisfy the rational connection
test in criminal cases. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 149 (1972);
Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 919, 923 n.24; Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 341, 352 (1970); Comment, Presumptions in the Criminal Law of Louisiana, 52 TUL. L.
REv. 793, 795 (1978); Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of
Malice in Maine, 54 B.U.L. REV. 973, 980 (1974). By contrast, Allen exempted permissive
inferences from any review beyond ascertaining whether the evidence in the case supports the
rationality of finding the presumed fact, because an inference "places no burden of any kind on
the defendant." 442 U.S. at 157.
176. 412 U.S. at 841-43.
177. Id. at 843. Notably, the difference in outcome between Gainey and Romano is explained
by the fact that proof of presence is sufficiently probative of "carrying on" the business of a
distillery, but too tenuous to permit a finding of "possession, custody, or control" of a distillery.
Id. at 841, 842. The supposed difference between a permissive inference in Gainey versus the
mandatory presumption in Romano, that Allen labeled as the most important reason for the
different results, was not mentioned. See County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157
n. 16. See note 184 infra.
178. 412 U.S. at 844.
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the parlance of facial validity, far removed from the particular facts of
Barnes. 179
To support its theory of applied review, the Allen majority cited
the following passage from Barnes:
In the present case the challenged instruction only permitted the infer-
ence of guilt from unexplained possession of recently stolen property. The
evidence established that petitioner possessed recently stolen Treasury
checks payable to persons he did not know, and it provided no plausible
explanation for such possession consistent with innocence. On the basis of
this evidence alone common sense and experience tell us that petitioner
must have known or been aware of the high probability that the checks
were stolen. Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S., at 417; Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S., at 46.180
The Allen majority apparently seized upon these references to what
the "petitioner" possessed and knew and what the "evidence" estab-
lished as support for its thesis. It is apparent, however, that the
above quoted language does not vitiate the conclusion that the Barnes
Court was reviewing the inference on its face. Although the conclud-
ing sentence of the passage refers to "petitioner," that is, Barnes, the
meaning of the sentence does not depend upon his identity. It is
general considerations of "common sense and experience" that tell us
that one who has possession of recently stolen property must have
been aware of its stolen nature. Nothing about the particulars of this
petitioner are cited to tell us that. The sentence only particularizes to
the extent that the petitioner and the treasury checks are plugged
into the general formula.' 8 ' Since this passage occurs near the end
of the section of the opinion dealing with the validity of the infer-
ence, and since the Court must decide the individual case before
it, the reference to the particular petitioner and the evidence in
179. Justice Brennan, who argued in dissent that the instruction did not meet the due proc-
ess requirement because "it cannot be said that all or virtually all endorsed United States
Treasury checks have been stolen," id. at 853 (Brennan, J., dissenting), also employed a facial
examination and had no quarrel with the majority's method of review. Justice Marshall joined
with the Brennan dissent. Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent also employing a facial
analysis. Id. at 848-52.
The passage from the Barnes footnote discussed earlier, see note 174 and accompanying text
supra, also indicates that the review was facial since the discussion focused on the general effect
of the inference to cause a defendant to come forward with evidence. If the Court were using
an "as applied" analysis, it might well have referred to the strong evidence presented at the
Barnes trial that caused a "practical" compulsion for rebuttal by the defendant.
180. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. at 845 (emphasis in original), cited in County Ct. of
Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
181. The concluding citations to Leary and Turner are also revealing. The page cited in
Turner contains the following language: " 'common sense' (Leary v. United States, supra at 46)
tells us that those who traffic in heroin will inevitably become aware that the product they deal
in is smuggled." Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417 (1969) (emphasis added). The
portion of Leary that is cited discusses whether "common sense" would support the conclusion
that "most marihuana possessors" have deduced the origin of their marihuana from awareness of
the level of importation. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 46. The facial review of the two
cited cases demonstrates that the Barnes Court was concerned at this point with whether
"common sense" would support the inference in general.
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terms of the inference, which was facially reviewed, is not surprising.
But it does not mean that the facial review has been converted to
"applied review."
Similarly, the first two sentences of the above quoted passage par-
ticularize only in applying the general terms of the common-law in-
ference to the particular case. But the finding did not otherwise de-
pend on the particulars. Strong proof had been offered against
Barnes: He had opened a checking account using the pseudonym
"Clarence Smith" one month before depositing four government
checks that were mailed to but never received by the four payees.
Each of the four checks bore the apparent endorsement of the payee
and a second endorsement by "Clarence Smith." A handwriting ex-
pert testified that both endorsements on two of the checks were exe-
cuted by Barnes. 182
Nowhere in the discussion of the validity of the inference do any of
these facts appear. The passage cited by the Allen majority par-
ticularizes only to the extent of stating that the case involved the
petitioner and stolen treasury checks payable to persons not known to
the petitioner. This is hardly surprising since it was the petitioner's
conviction for possession of United States Treasury checks that was
before the Court. Perhaps the addition of "to persons not known to
petitioner" begins to creep into the particular evidence of the case,
but it is scant authority for concluding that the inference was re-
viewed as applied, given the host of other facts more probative of
guilt that are not mentioned. 18 3
The purpose of the Allen majority in reviewing Gainey, Ronmno,184
and the other principal cases involving presumptions was to show that
182. 412 U.S. at 838-39.
183. The statement that no plausible explanation of possession of the treasury checks was
offered, see note 180 and accompanying text supra, is also not the equivalent of applied review.
The particulars of the implausible explanation adduced at trial were not analyzed. The explana-
tion included the claim that Barnes received the checks from salespersons whom he employed
but whom he could not name or identify. This staff of employees purportedly sold furniture for
him door to door. Barnes also claimed that he had received the checks with the payees' en-
dorsements and that no records were kept of the furniture orders because they were written on
scratch paper that was not retained. 412 U.S. at 839.
184. The Allen opinion discussed Gainey and Romano in greater detail than any of the other
cases included in its historical review. See 442 U.S. at 157 n. 16. Its unsatisfactory analysis of the
two cases is representative of the generally insubstantial foundation upon which it attempted to
erect its two-tiered structure of review of deductive devices. The difference in outcome be-
tween Gainey and Romano was attributed in part to the difference in scope of the two statutes.
But "of perhaps greater importance," according to the Allen majority, was the difference in the
instructions given to the jury in the two cases. Id. The Allen majority stated that
in Gainey, the judge had explained that the presumption was permissive; it did not
require the jury to convict the defendant even if it was convinced that he was
present at the site. On the contrary, the instructions made it clear that presence
was only "'a circumstance to be considered along with all the other circumstances in
the case."' . .. In Romano, the trial judge told the jury that the defendant's pres-
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Allen was the inevitable outgrowth of a long line of cases. In fact,
however, the cases cited by Allen demonstrate that all deductive de-
vices, whether mandatory or permissive, were tested facially. Al-
though it was often not clear whether the deductive device under
review was regarded as a permissive inference or a mandatory pre-
sumption, this fact only underscores the Court's lack of consciousness
of the distinction made crucial by Allen.
III. PERMISSIVE INFERENCES AND RATIONAL JURY VERDICTS
Justice Stevens's claim that Allen was the natural outgrowth of Tot,
Gainey, Romano, Leary, Turner, and Barnes is ironic in light of the
frequent observation that the Court had subjected deductive devices
to increasingly stricter scrutiny prior to Allen. Numerous academic
commentators, in parsing the opinions from Tot to Barnes, saw the
Court moving toward a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in apply-
ing the rational connection test.' 8 5 The Court was notably less
deferential to the congressional factual determination underlying the
deductive devices in the later cases of Turner and Leary than had
been true in Gainey.'8 6 Leary placed the burden of persuasion on
the government to demonstrate the rationality of the deductive de-
vices at trial and on appeal in contrast to the practice of federal courts
of appeal that had uniformly upheld the deductive device struck
down in Leary. l8 7 Although Tot had stated that the comparative
convenience test remained a "corollary" of the rational connection
ence at the still "'shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction."'
Although there was other evidence of guilt, that instruction authorized conviction
even if the jury disbelieved all of the testimony except the proof of presence at the
site.
Id.
According to Justice Stevens, the words spoken by the judge in Romano that tainted the
verdict and made facial consideration of the statutory device necessary were that presence "shall
be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction." These were the exact words that were
also read to the jury in Gainey from a nearly identical statute. It is true that the judge in
Gainey made a herculean attempt to minimize the coercive impact of the statutory "inference,"
but the message was not as clear as the Allen majority maintained because the jury was also
given the "shall be deemed sufficient evidence" language of the statute. Justice Stevens might
have found better support for his thesis if he had focused on other parts of the jury charge in
Romano. Prior to instructing the jury about the specific deductive device involved in the case,
the judge told the jury that an inference "is a deduction which reason and common sense lead
the jury to draw . .." but a presumption was defined "as a conclusion which the law requires
the jury to make, or permits them to make from the particular facts, in the absence of convinc-
ing testimony to the contrary." United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), Record at 95
(emphasis added). The judge then instructed the jury on the specific device involved simply by
reciting the statute including its title: "Presumptions-Unregistered Stills." Id. Justice Stevens
did not cite these confusing directions, perhaps because the Romano Court made no reference
to them.
185. See note 175 supra.
186. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARsv. L. REV. 7, 106, 107 (1969).
187. See id. at 107-08 and cases cited therein at 108 n.21.
188. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
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test, 188 Leary held that Tot had "implicitly abandoned" comparative
convenience. '8 9
Had Allen not intervened, Sandstrom would have been another
significant step in keeping with the general trend. The primacy that
Sandstrom properly gives to how a juror might interpret an instruc-
tion was a. position urged by several pre-Sandstrom commentators
who favored the more restrictive attitude toward presumptions. As
one such commentator put it, "[i]f the jury is instructed in ambiguous
terms regarding the burden of the opponent of a presumption, it
makes little sense for a court to assess the validity of the device in
light of the burden which it was theoretically intended to affect." 190
In fact, Sandstrom might well call for the invalidation of the deduc-
tive devices that were sustained in Gainey and Turner since the "un-
less satisfactorily explained by the defendants" language reasonably
could be interpreted to require the defendant to raise more than a
reasonable doubt to satisfy the jury. 191
Sandstrom has already had a significant impact in causing convic-
tions to be vacated in several jurisdictions. 192 Furthermore, inas-
much as Sandstrom does not appear to be susceptible to a harmless
189. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 45 (1969). The government made the comparative
convenience argument that the marihuana statute in Leary, see notes 131-33 and accompanying
text supra, "put every marihuana smoker on notice that he must be prepared to show that
any marihuana in his possession was not illegally imported." Id. at 44-45. The government
argued that "it is not unfair to require him [the defendant] to adduce evidence on this point"
since the possessor is "the person most likely to know the marihuana's origin." Id. The govern-
ment pointed out that this approach had been taken in the pre-Tot presumption case of Yee
Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925), where the Court had stated: "Legitimate possession
[of opium] ... is so highly improbable that ... you [the defendant] must at your peril ascer-
tain and be prepared to show the facts and circumstances which rebut, or tend to rebut, the
natural inference of unlawful importation." Id. at 184, quoted in 395 U.S. at 44. Leary rejected
this argument, and required the government to show, with substantial assurance, that the pre-
sumed fact was more likely than not to follow from the basic fact, even though the defendant
had better access to the facts. 395 U.S. at 45-46.
190. Comment, Criminal Statutory Presumptions and the Reasonable Doubt Standard of
Proof: Is Due Process Overdue? 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 223, 226 (1974). See also Ashford &
Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Over-
view, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 201-03 (1969); Note, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Pre-
sumptions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 141, 150 (1966).
191. See note 115 supra.
192. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371, 1373 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1228 (1st Cir. 1979); Dreske v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health & Social
Servs., 483 F. Supp. 783, 787 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Dlugash v. New York, 476 F. Supp. 921, 924
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Holloway v. McElroy, 474 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (M.D. Ga. 1979). But see
United States ex rel. Swimley v. Nesbitt, 608 F.2d 1130, 1133 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Davis, 608 F.2d 698, 699 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980); Gagne v.
Meachum, 602 F.2d 471, 473 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1980); Jacks v.
Duckworth, 486 F. Supp. 1366, 1373 (N.D. Ind. 1980); United States ex. rel. Collins v. Crist,
473 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Mont. 1979); Mclnerney v. Berman, 473 F. Supp. 187, 190 (D.
Mass. 1979).
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error analysis 193 or to merely prospective application, 194 the signifi-
cance of Sandstrom cannot be doubted. Yet in the long run, Allen
greatly diminishes Sandstrom. The Sandstrom decision left open the
possibility that a mandatory presumption that shifts the burden of
production, but not the burden of persuasion, might be able to sur-
vive a constitutional challenge. 195 Yet legislatures and courts will be
unlikely to draft mandatory presumptions shifting the burden of pro-
duction since such a device will be subjected to a facial review mea-
sured by a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The ready alternative
is the permissive inference. Under Allen, inferences will not be re-
viewed at all if the presumed fact passes the traditionally minimal
scrutiny of sufficiency of the evidence. Few drafters of deductive de-
vices will leave the tranquil shallows of a permissive inference to
enter the comparatively treacherous waters of a mandatory presump-
tion shifting the burden of production. If this prediction is correct,
the result will be that the Court will gradually withdraw from the
business of reviewing the facial rationality of deductive devices be-
cause all such devices will be drafted as permissive inferences. This
diminished scrutiny is disturbing, because as the next section of this
Article will argue, the dangers inherent in deductive devices do not
only implicate the burden of production and persuasion issues that
concerned the Allen majority. 196 Deductive devices also imperil
another due process value: ensuring the nonarbitrary and rational na-
ture of the decisionmaking.
A. Jury Reliance on Deductive Devices
With a permissive inference, even if the defendant produces no
evidence to rebut the existence of the presumed fact, whether the
fact has been "proved" is an issue to be resolved by the jury. The
193. See Note, Presumptive Intent Jury Instructions After Sandstrom, 1980 Wis. L. REV.
366, 381-89 [hereinafter cited as Note, Presumptive Intent]. This Note argues convincingly that
the "overwhelming untainted evidence" harmless error standard is inapplicable to an instruction
found defective on Sandstrom grounds. Since a jury can rely on a deductive device to reach a
verdict while rejecting or failing to consider evidence presented at trial, "a reviewing court has
no recourse to other, untainted evidence." Id. at 387. But see Krezminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d
121, 125-26 (6th Cir. 1980); Mason v. Balkcom, 487 F. Supp. 554, 559 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
194. In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), the Court held that where the
major purpose of a constitutional rule is to protect the factfinding process, neither good-faith
reliance nor severe impact on the administration of justice can prevent retroactive application.
Hankerson held Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), see notes 230-45 and accompanying
text infra, to be retroactive. Since Sandstrom implements Mullaney's due process concerns with
shifts in the burden of persuasion in the context of jury instructions, it appears that Sandstrom
also must be given retroactive application. See Note, Presumptive Intent, supra note 193, at 382
n.70, and the cases cited therein.
195. Sandstrom made it clear that a mandatory presumption shifting the burden of persuasion
or a conclusive presumption is unconstitutional. 442 U.S. at 524.
196. County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157, 166-67.
19811
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jury should be instructed both that it need not accept the inference
and that the burden of persuasion remains with the prosecution to
prove the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The Allen major-
ity saw no reason to subject a permissive inference to facial review for
this reason.
Permissive inferences, however, imperil the rationality of factfind-
ing. Although the jury is not required to credit the inference, it is
told that it may do so. If the inference is irrational, the jury may
nevertheless rely on it as sufficient to find guilt. Consider the follow-
ing hypothetical inference: Under our penal law upon proof that the
defendant caused a death on Friday, you may draw the inference that
the defendant committed an intentional homicide. Under Allen, once
the court was assured that the jury instruction clearly communicated
only a permissive inference, the court would assume that the jury had
made reasonable use of the inference if there was sufficient evidence
in the record demonstrating the defendant's intentional Friday
homicide. 197 There is no principled basis under Allen to strike down
a conviction obtained following this instruction so long as the trial
court record will pass the traditionally minimal scrutiny of sufficiency
of the evidence. 198 Thus, irrational verdicts would be sustained
under the Allen analysis if there was sufficient evidence in the record
to support the finding of the fact presumed, even though the jury
may have reached its verdict based upon the inference alone while
ignoring or rejecting the evidence.
Allen's abandonment of the facial rational connection test for per-
missive inferences,' 99 therefore, sanctions the possibility of arbitrari-
ness, the possibility that the jury will reach a verdict without refer-
ence to the evidence produced at trial. The evidence adduced at trial
may or may not influence the jury's decision to credit the inference.
Thus, it is possible that the evidence in the record, used post hoc by
197. The common experience that may lead a jury to reject this particular inference may not
be available in other circumstances. See notes 221-24 and accompanying text infra.
198. See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
199. The abandonment of the rational connection test is disturbing not because it was a
satisfactory basis of review, but because Allen's retreat from the test sanctions the withdrawal of
any meaningful review of permissive inferences. Professor Nesson of Harvard University has
persuasively argued that the rational connection test was misconceived. See generally Nesson,
supra note 152. Professor Nesson contended that permissive inferences are simply at odds with
jury decisionmaking under the reasonable doubt standard because inferences provide an abstract
formula that may be credited as a sufficient basis for a determination of guilt. "Permissive
inferences thus permit juries to avoid assessing the myriad facts which make specific cases
unique." Id. at 1192. Professor Nesson argued that unless the probability of an abstract pre-
sumed fact following from proof of an abstract basic fact is 100%, inferences undercut the proper
function of the jury to weigh the unique facts of each case. See id. at 1191. Professor Nesson's
proposal was that permissive inferences must be modified so that an abstract formula no longer
provides a sufficient basis for guilt. So long as the inference instruction merely alerts the jury
that the basic fact is deemed "highly probative of guilt," it does not subvert the purpose of jury
decisionmaking uinder the reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 1222-23.
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an appellate court to support the rationality of finding the presumed
fact, was irrelevant to how the jury reached its verdict. In the specific
context of the Allen facts, once the jury accepted the undisputed tes-
timony that the two handguns were in the car occupied by the four
defendants, the jury may have reached its ultimate decision that all
four occupants of the car possessed the two handguns solely because
the judge informed them that "ro]ur penal law" provides that you
may infer upon proof of presence of weapons in an automobile that
the weapons were possessed by each of the defendants who occupied
it.20 0  Some or all of the Allen jurors might have reached their deci-
sions in this way while simply ignoring or even rejecting such evi-
dence as the location of the guns in the car. Justice Stevens's scolding
of the Second Circuit for testing the inference in a hypothetical situa-
tion 2 0 ' simply ignored the fact that inferences permit decisionmaking
based upon a generalization regardless of the facts.20 2 The refusal of
the Allen majority to recognize this possible impact is revealed in its
statement that "t]here is no more reason to require a permissive
statutory presumption to meet a reasonable-doubt standard before it
may be permitted to play any part in a trial than there is to require
that degree of probative force for other relevant evidence before it
may be admitted." 203
A piece of relevant evidence only tends to prove guilt, but under
Allen a jury may be instructed that a permissive inference is sufficient
to find guilt or an essential element of guilt. There is no way of know-
ing whether the jury has tested the inference against the evidence at
trial. Although the Allen majority hypothesized how the jury could
have used the evidence at trial to make a reasonable application of
the inference, its reconstruction was less than convincing. Four
people were found to possess 204 two guns which were "perhaps"
within the easy reach of the men in the back seat, 20 5 even though
this was not a conspiratorial crime and no evidence of an agreement
of joint or nonsimultaneous possession among the four was intro-
duced.
But more fundamentally, the fact that an appellate court can con-
struct a reasonable application of the inference grounded in the evi-
dence does not mean that this is the way that the jury reached its
decision. Even if the instructions on the statutory device in Allen
could not be reasonably interpreted as conclusive or as shifting the
200. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
201. 442 U.S. at 155-56 & nn.14 & 15.
202. See note 199 supra.
203. 442 U.S. at 167.
204. The New York statute defined possession as having actual dominion and control or in-
tent and ability to retain such control or doninion. See id. at 161 n.21, 164-65.
205. 442 U.S. at 163.
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burden of persuasion, 206 the other jury instructions do not suggest
that the jury must test the inference against the evidence in order to
reach its decision. The Allen dissenters recognized the possibility that
the inference authorized conviction even if the jury disbelieved all
the prosecution's evidence except for proof of presence in the au-
tomobile. 20 7 The majority relied, however, on the jury's acquittal of
the defendants on the charges of possession of the heroin and
weapons found in the trunk, despite another presumption that
applied to that contraband. 20 8 To the majority, the split verdict indi-
cated the jury's independent evaluation of the evidence. The Court
argued further that
if the jury rejected the testimony describing where the guns were found,
it would necessarily also have rejected the only evidence in the record
proving that the guns were found in the car. The conclusion that the jury
attached significance to the particular location of the handguns follows in-
exorably from the acquittal on the charge of possession of the machinegun
and heroin in the trunk.
2 0 9
This rebuttal prompted the dissenters to accuse the majority of ap-
plying an "unarticulated harmless-error standard." 2 10  In fact,
206. In justifying its denial that the jury might have relied on the inference alone without
testing it against the other evidence adduced at trial, the Allen majority stated that
[tihe trial judge's instructions make it clear that the presumption was merely a part
of the prosecution's case, that it gave rise to a permissive inference available only in
certain circumstances, rather than a mandatory conclusion of possession, and that it
could be ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative proof offered by
defendants in rebuttal. . . . He [the trial judge] also carefully instructed the jury
that there is a mandatory presumption of innocence in favor of the defendants that
controls unless it, as the exclusive trier of fact, is satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendants possessed the handguns ....
442 U.S. at 160-61. The Sandstrom decision contains a refutation of this line of reasoning. In a
footnote the Sandstrom Court stated that
[t]he potential for these interpretations of the presumption [as being conclusive or
mandatory, burden shifting] was not removed by the other instructions given at the
trial. It is true that the jury was instructed generally that the accused was presumed
innocent until proved guilty, and that the State had the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of the deceased purposely or
knowingly. . . . But this is not rhetorically inconsistent with a conclusive or
burden-shifting presumption. The jury could have interpreted the two sets of in-
structions as indicating that the presumption was a means by which proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as to intent could be satisfied. For example, if the presumption
were viewed as conclusive, the jury could have believed that although intent must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, proof of the voluntary slaying and its ordi-
nary consequences constituted proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
442 U.S. at 518 n.7. As in Sandstrom, the instruction on the deductive device in Allen can be
understood as a means by which the prosecution's burden of persuasion is satisfied. See also
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946) (misleading error in a specific jury in-
struction on a vital issue is not cured by prior unexceptional and unilluminating abstract
charge).
207. County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 175 (Powell, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 162 n.23.
209. Id. at 166 n.29.
210. Id. at 177 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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though, the quotation evidences the majority's refusal to give cre-
dence to the possibility that the jury ignored the other evidence ad-
duced at trial in reaching its verdict. The majority's logic fails since a
jury is entitled to believe only portions of a witness's testimony. The
jury could have believed that the weapons were present in the car
but disbelieved the evidence of their location and accessibility. This is
particularly true of the evidence of the drugs and the weapons found
in the locked trunk, since the evidence showed that the driver had
borrowed the car from his brother.21' Furthermore, although it is
true that the acquittal on the two charges relating to the contraband
in the trunk obviously demonstrates that the jury did not use the
statutory inference to convict for those two charges, the implications
of this action remain ambiguous. The Chief Justice noted in a short
concurrence that the jury "had reached what was obviously a com-
promise verdict in the case." 212  It might have been necessary to
convince jurors inclined to acquit that the judge had instructed that
"our penal law" permits the Allen statutory inference in order to mus-
ter the votes needed for the compromise convictions envisioned by
Justice Burger. This speculation is offered not because it must have
happened, but because it underscores the ambiguity of a general ver-
dict in a criminal case. The Allen majority's speculation that the jury
reached its verdict without sole, untested reliance on the inference is
not a reliable basis for its decision.
B. Coercive Permission
Any deductive device, whether mandatory or permissive, has per-
nicious possibilities because it presents to the jury an easy solution to
its task. If the facts and the instructions are difficult or confusing, an
inference is an attractive invitation offered by twin authority figures,
the trial judge and "the law." 213 Unfortunately, no major studies of
juries have examined the impact of the deductive device instruc-
tion.2 14 The Supreme Court itself has recognized, however, that
"It]he normal assumption is that the jury will follow the statute and,
acting in accordance with the authority it confers, will accept as suffi-
cient what the statute expressly so describes." 2 1 5  Ignoring the au-
211. Id. at 144 n.3.
212. Id. at 167 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
213. Cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 72 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
214. See generally Davis, Bray, & Holt, The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries:
A Critical Review, in LAw, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LECAL ISSUES 326-61 (J. TAPP & F. LEVINE eds. 1977).
215. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 237 (1911). Sandstrom is consistent with Bailey. In
Sandstrom, the state had argued that its instruction was not unconstitutional because the jury
could have found that the homicide was committed knowingly or purposely and that the pre-
sumptive intent instruction went only to purpose. 442 U.S. at 525. The Court rejected this
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thoritative force of the presumption as it is presented to the jury, the
Allen majority simply assumed that the presumptively rational fact-
finder will make a reasonable application of a permissive inference
based on the evidence at trial. In other areas involving independent
evaluations of evidence, the Court has not been willing to make such
assumptions. In Jackson v. Denno,216 the Supreme Court invalidated
a jury instruction in which the jury received a confession but was
instructed that it could consider it only if it found the confession to
be voluntary. 217 Such a procedure was found to be unreliable be-
cause it was impossible to tell from a general verdict whether the jury
found the confession voluntary or was influenced by the confession
despite finding it involuntary. As the Court stated, "[1]t cannot be
assumed .. . that the jury reliably found the facts against the ac-
cused." 218
Similarly, in Bruton v. United States,219 although the jury was in-
structed that a confession of a codefendant implicating Bruton was not
to be considered as evidence against Bruton, the Supreme Court held
that the admission of the evidence in a joint trial violated due proc-
ess. The confession in Bruton had probative value, and the jury may
have given it only the weight allowed by the instructions, but the
possibility that the jury was unable to separate the codefendant's con-
fession from Bruton's tainted the conviction. 220 Bruton is illustrative
of the approach taken in any case involving hearsay or other evidence
deemed prejudicial. The evidence may have probative value, but the
concern that the jury will give it undue weight requires its exclusion.
Since a permissive inference is a sufficient basis to find guilt or an
essential element of guilt, an inference is often a greater inducement
to arbitrariness than a single piece of prejudicial evidence that only
tends to prove guilt. Yet, in Allen, the Court merely assumed that
the jury was uninfluenced by the inference when its application
would be irrational given the facts of the case.
argument, stating that "[w]ith the assistance of the presumption, the latter [purpose] would
have been easier to find than the former [knowledge], and there is no reason to believe the jury
would have deliberately undertaken the more difficult task." Id. at 526 n.13.
216. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
217. Id. at 377, 391.
218. Id. at 386-87 (footnote omitted). But see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568-69 (1967)
(Texas recidivist statute upheld under which jury informed of defendant's prior record before
reaching a verdict, but told to consider this record only for purposes of sentencing). But see
Hicks v. Oklahoma, __ U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. 2227 (1980). In Hicks, a 40-year mandatory sen-
tence under an Oklahoma recidivist statute was affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals despite the fact that the statute was later declared unconstitutional. The Oklahoma
court reasoned that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the invalid statute because the
sentence was within the range of punishment that could have been given without the recidivist
statute. The Supreme Court reversed, pointing to the possibility that the recidivist provision
might have prejudiced the jury. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 2229.
219. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
220. Id. at 126. But see Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 64 (1979) (Bruton not extended to
cases where codefendants have given interlocking confessions).
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The inherently coercive effect of a deductive device may be further
increased by the jury's lack of knowledge or experience. While the
invitation to find that if it was Friday, then it may be intentional
murder, should not be attractive to juries because of the patently
arbitrary nature of the inference, with many presumptions the jury
will have no basis on which to reject the proffered invitation to find
the presumed fact. The deductive devices in Turner and Leary pro-
vide good examples. In order to determine whether the deductive
devices in these cases were rational, the Court surveyed an enormous
amount of literature and marshalled facts that had not been presented
to the jury on such relevant topics as the amount of domestic produc-
tion of the controlled substances, the possibilities of synthetic produc-
tion of heroin, and the level of illegal importation. Although such
matters may be necessary to make a meaningful evaluation of an in-
ference, an average juror cannot be expected to be knowledgeable
about them.
In Leary, the defendant's efforts to introduce evidence of the pro-
portion of domestically consumed marihuana which had been grown
in the United States were rebuffed by the trial court. 22  This very
question was deemed vital by the Supreme Court in assessing the
rationality of the deductive device in Leary. 222 The arbitrary results
of such a system were dramatically highlighted in the case of United
States v. Peeples.223 In Peeples, the jury was given the same instruc-
tion as in Turner concerning finding all other elements of guilt from
proof of possession of heroin. After deliberating for a while, the jury
asked the judge what was the percentage of heroin produced illegally
in this country. Since there was no evidence in the record concerning
this question, the judge declined to answer. 224 Thus, the Peeples
jury was denied the very information deemed essential to an evalua-
tion of the rationality of the statutory device in Turner. Both cases
illustrate the judicial sleight of hand involved in deductive devices.
Empirical evidence of a general nature is deemed irrelevant for jury
consideration, but this same material becomes crucial to appellate re-
view under the rational connection test. It does not matter that the
burden of production or persuasion never shifted on the various ele-
ments presumed in Turner or Leary. If the jury has no way of
evaluating the inference and the prosecution provides no evidence on
these matters because of reliance on the inference, the jury will have
no reason to reject the invitation offered by the instruction. A per-
missive inference dealing with a technical matter, therefore, can have
a more coercive impact on the jury than a mandatory presumption
221. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 37 n.66 (1969).
222. See notes 137-38 and accompanying text supra.
223. 377 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1967).
224. Id. at 208.
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shifting the burden of production, at least in jurisdictions where a
mandatory presumption is said to disappear, like a bursting bubble in
the classic simile, if the opponent of the presumption produces some
rebuttal evidence. 225 Thus, a defendant can prevent the instruction
from being read to the jury by meeting this small burden. 226 But
since the burden of production never shifts with a permissive infer-
ence, the jury will hear the instruction no matter how much evidence
the defense introduces to demonstrate that there is no basis for find-
ing the presumed fact. The supposedly innocuous permissive infer-
ence can be more onerous than a mandatory presumption.
It should not be supposed that trial judges can guard against the
possibility of verdicts based on an irrational inference by entering
judgments of acquittal either before or after submission of the case to
the jury. So long as enough evidence of the basic fact of a permissive
inference is presented to make that fact a jury issue, the existence of
the presumed fact is necessarily a jury issue as well. Even if the
prosecution relies totally on a permissive inference by presenting no
evidence of the existence of the presumed fact, the trial judge is not
empowered to direct a verdict of acquittal since the inference is a
permissible basis for a guilty verdict. For example, in Allen the pros-
ecution made no attempt to present evidence of possession of the
weapons by any particular individual, aside from proof of presence of
the defendants and the weapons in the car. No evidence of an agree-
225. Thayer and later Wigmore were of the opinion that presumptions should merely shift
the burden of production to the opponent of a presumption. Once the judge determined that
evidence had been offered by the opponent, the "bubble would burst" and the presumption
would fall out of the case. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 82. In contrast, Morgan and
McCormick proposed a view of presumptions which leaves the presumptive bubble intact
against de minimis productions of evidence. They criticized the Thayer view for giving too slight
an effect to the presumption since it could be defeated by evidence that was inherently incredi-
ble. The standard of evidence that must be produced to destroy the presumption under the
Morgan-McCormick view is most often labeled as "substantial evidence," but formulations vary
widely from one jurisdiction to another. For an in-depth discussion of the contrasting views of
presumptions, see Hecht & Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions: Order out of Chaos, 58 B.U.L.
REV. 527 (1978); Lents, Presumptions in Texas: A Study in Irrational Jury Control, 52 TEXAS L.
REV. 1329 (1974); Mueller, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions in Civil Cases: Comparing
Federal Rule 301 with Uniform Rule 301, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 219 (1977).
226. Professor Nesson has taken issue with the idea that the judge can decline to inform the
jury of a presumption, Nesson quotes judge Learned Hand as stating, "If the trial is properly
conducted, the presumption will not be mentioned at all ...." See Nesson, supra note 152, at
1201 n.35 (quoting Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania Ry., 60 F.2d 734, 736 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 647 (1932)). Nesson states that "[t]he most that can be meant by such
statements ... is that the word 'presumption' should not be used ... since it is fraught with
connotations and will often confuse the jury." Nesson, supra note 152, at 1201 n.35.
Professor Nesson's comments overlooked the fact that Judge Hand was sitting in a diversity
case applying the law of New York which followed the Thayer view of presumptions. See note
225 supra. The Thayer model asserts that the decision whether the production burden is met is
for the judge alone. Once the burden is satisfied, the presumption is to drop out of the case.
See Hecht & Pinzler, supra note 225, at 552. See also People v. Hemmer, 19 Cal. App. 3d
1052, 1060-63, 97 Cal. Rptr. 516, 521-23 (1971) (instruction to the jury concerning a presump-
tion when evidence has been introduced to rebut it is reversible error).
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ment of joint possession by the defendants was offered. Nonetheless,
the trial judge denied the defendants' motion for a judgment of ac-
quittal because the prosecution could rely on the inference of posses-
sion of weapons upon proof of their presence in the automobile oc-
cupied by the defendants. 227 It is not uncommon for the prosecution
to rely on an inference rather than to present much or any evidence
of the presumed fact because deductive devices are usually created to
assist the prosecution in areas where proof is difficult.2 28
Assuming that prima facie evidence of the basic fact and elements
not the subject of an inference have been presented, inferences also
eliminate the defendant's opportunity for a directed verdict. For this
reason, the defendant in Gainey argued on appeal that the inference
in that case was unconstitutional because it impinged upon the
judge's power to direct an acquittal. Unpersuaded, the Court found
no curtailment of a trial judge's authority to direct a verdict or to
issue a judgment n.o.v. 22 9
Yet the Court could not have meant that the trial judge may simply
disagree with a valid congressional enactment. Did the Court mean
that trial judges are entitled to direct acquittals if they believe that
227. County Ct. of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 144-45.
228. See Nesson, supra note 152, at 1187.
229. The Court stated:
The statute before us deprives the trial judge of none of his normal judicial powers.
We do not interpret the provision in the statute that unexplained 'presence ...
shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction' as in any way invading
the province of the judge's discretion. The language permits the judge to submit a
case to the jury on the basis of the accused's presence alone, and to this extent it
constitutes congressional recognition that the fact of presence does have probative
worth in the determination of guilt.
But where the only evidence is of presence the statute does not require the judge
to submit the case to the jury, nor does it preclude the grant of a judgment, not-
withstanding the verdict. And the Court of Appeals may still review the trial judge's
denial of motions for a directed verdict or for a judgment n.o.v.
United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 68 (1965). The majority's position on this issue drew a
sharp and cogent rebuke from Justice Black in his dissent:
The Court holds that this statutory command in § 5601(b)(2) is valid, but then for
some reason adds that judges are free to ignore it or, after telling juries that they
may rely on it, are free to set aside the verdicts of those juries which do ...
judges are not usually given such unlimited discretion to disregard valid statutes.
Id. at 76 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
One commentator has suggested that the Gainey Court may have been moving toward a
constitutional doctrine of a mandatory power of judicial acquittal in criminal cases. Comment,
Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling the Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 157, 168 n.40 (1970). The Comment recognized that the passage in Gainey is the only
authority for such a proposition and that all cases dealing with a motion for acquittal in the
federal system are based on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a), not constitutional
grounds. The Comment also stated that the statutory device in Gainey appears to be "a legisla-
tive statement that a motion for acquittal under Rule 29(a) must be denied if the basic fact of
presence at the illegal still is established." Id. If Gainey made the power to direct a verdict
constitutional, the statutory device involved could only be constitutional if the trial judge were
free to disagree with the congressional enactment allowing presence to serve as a sufficient basis
for guilt.
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proof at trial negated the rationality of the inference as applied in the
specific case? This interpretation is only another way of saying that a
judge may ignore the statute, since, upon adequate proof of the basic
fact, the statutory inference provides a sufficient basis for guilt regard-
less of the state of the evidence on the presumed fact. For example,
suppose that the defense in Gainey had presented credible unrebut-
ted evidence that the defendant became separated from a hiking ex-
pedition and stumbled onto the site of an illegal still just as federal
agents arrived at the scene. The prosecution runs the risk that the
jury will believe the defense evidence if no prosecution rebuttal is
presented. But the absence of any prosecution rebuttal can provide
no basis for a directed verdict of acquittal since by statute it is per-
missible for the jury to rely on the inference to find that the defen-
dant was "carrying on" a distillery from the proof of his presence at
the site.
Although permissive inferences have long diminished a defendant's
opportunity for a directed verdict, Allen went further by virtually
eliminating appellate court review of the rationality of permissive in-
ferences. Under Allen, if the formalistic requirement of permissive
language is observed, the jury alone determines the rationality of the
inference. If a jury does not evaluate the inference but simply relies
on it to find a defendant guilty, its decision will escape appellate re-
view so long as a reviewing court can recreate any reasonable
hypothesis of guilt from the facts presented at trial. If the appellate
courts have virtually no role in assessing the rationality of permissive
inferences, the pretense that the trial judge maintains such a duty is
now fully undermined.
IV. AFFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND PERMISSIVE INFERENCES
A. Formalism in the Treatment of Affirmative Defenses
1. Mullaney v. Wilbur230
The formalistic impact of Allen/Sandstrom is highly reminiscent of
the Court's journey from Mullaney v. Wilbur to Patterson v. New
York. 23' Mullaney dealt with Maine's century-old scheme of distin-
guishing murder from manslaughter. The MIullaney jury was in-
structed that "malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable
element of the crime of murder without which the homicide would
be manslaughter."' 232 The jury was also instructed that "if the pros-
ecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlaw-
ful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the
230. 421 U.S. 684 (1975),
231. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
232. 421 U.S. at 686.
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defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he
acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation." 233
Mullaney had argued, based on In re Winship, 234 that this instruc-
tion denied him due process of law by shifting the burden of persua-
sion to the defendant on the essential element of malice
aforethought. 23 5  In Winship, the Court for the first time made
explicit that due process required the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime ...
charged."23 6 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rejected the defen-
dant's contention, holding that under state law murder and man-
slaughter are not distinct crimes, but rather, "different degrees of the
single generic offense of felonious homicide." 23 7  The United States
Supreme Court accepted the Maine court's construction of Maine's
homicide statute 238 but differed with its conclusion as to its constitu-
tionality. 23 9 It did not matter that "as a formal matter," the absence
of "heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a 'fact necessary to
constitute the crime' of felonious homicide." 240  By drawing this dis-
tinction while refusing to establish the fact beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Maine procedures violated due process. Justice Powell for
the unanimous Court explained that if Winship were limited to those
facts that constitute a crime as defined by the state, then the interests
that Winship sought to protect could be undermined simply by rede-
fining elements of crimes and labeling them "as factors that bear
solely on the extent of punishment." 241 The Mulaney Court insisted
that "Winship is concerned with substance rather than this kind of
formalism." 242
Mullaney quickly provoked an enormous literature that recognized
the wide-ranging implications of the decision. 243 Many commen-
tators heralded Mullaney as the end of affirmative defenses and pre-
sumptions in the criminal law 244 and several courts reached similar
conclusions. 245
233. Id.
234. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
235. 421 U.S. at 687.
236. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
237. See 421 U.S. at 688.
238. Id. at 691.
239. Id. at 704.
240. Id. at 697.
241. Id. at 698.
242. Id. at 699.
243. See, e.g., Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, The Supreme Court and the Substantive Criminal
Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269 (1977);
Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Mean-
ing of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REV. 775 (1975); Comment, The Burden of Proofand the
Insanity Defense After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 28 ME. L. REV. 435 (1976). See also note 244 infra,
and sources cited therein.
244. See, e.g., Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal
Charges, 29 ARK. L. REV. 429 (1976); Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Bur-
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2. Patterson v. New York 246
Two terms after Mullaney the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of New York statutes that defined murder in terms of
intentionally causing the death of another. The statutory scheme pro-
vided that a defendant could escape punishment for murder and be
subject only to conviction for manslaughter if he could persuade the
jury by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under the
influence of "extreme emotional disturbance." 247  Extreme emotional
disturbance is the functional equivalent of the common-law defense of
"in the heat of passion." The new defense was taken almost verbatim
from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which had ex-
panded the common-law defense in several ways. Provocation was to
be viewed from the defendant's perspective rather than objec-
tively. 248 Furthermore, the provocation no longer had to be im-
mediate as it did under the "in the heat of passion" defense but could
include emotional disturbance that lasted for a much longer period of
time.24 9  New York deviated from the ALI model in one important
(lens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977); Comment, Affirmative De-
fenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 171 (1976); Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionality of Placing a
Burden of Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEO. L.J. 871 (1976); Comment, Unburden-
ing the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11
HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 390 (1976); Comment, Constitutional and Legislative Issues Raised by
the Entrapment Defense in Maine, 29 ME. L. REV. 170 (1977); Note, Due Process and the
Insanity Defense: Examining Shifts in the Burden of Production, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 123
(1977); Comment, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L.J.
828 (1975); Comment, Mens Rea, Due Process and the Burden of Proving Sanity or Insanity, 5
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 113 (1977).
245. See Hallowell v. Keve, 555 F.2d 103 (3d Cir, 1977); Grace v. Hopper, 425 F. Supp.
1355 (M.D. Ga. 1977), rev'd, 566 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 844 (1978);
Berrier v. Egeler, 428 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 583 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Gagne v. Meacham, 423 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Mass. 1976); State v.
Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa 1975); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975),
aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976); State v. Matheson, 363 A.2d 716 (Me. 1976).
The most common affirmative defense upheld after Mullaney but before Patterson was the
insanity defense. This result was influenced by the concurring opinion of Justice Rehnquist in
Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704-06. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that Mullaney did not overrule
the Court's previous decision in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). Leland upheld the
constitutionality of an Oregon statute requiring a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. For decisions following Justice Rehnquist's view, see
Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976); Hill v. Lockhart,
516 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1975); Shanahan v. United States, 354 A.2d 524 (D.C. 1976); State v.
Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 (1975); State v. Melvin, 341 A.2d 376
(Me. 1975); State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976); Guynes v. State, 92 Nev. 693,
558 P.2d 626 (1976).
246. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
247. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.20(2) (McKINNEY 1975). A corresponding section of the New
York law makes "extreme emotional disturbance" an affirmative defense to a charge of murder
in the second degree. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(1)(A) (McKINNEY 1975).
248. ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(1)(b), Proposed Official Draft (1962).
249. See Comment, Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme
Emotional Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 171, 195-96 [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Affirmative Defenses]. See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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regard, however: whereas the Model Penal Code required only that
the defendant bear the burden of production, New York required that
the defendant shoulder the burden of persuasion as well. 25 0
Although the scope of New York's extreme-emotional-disturbance
defense was broader than Maine's "in the heat of passion" defense, it
functioned in the same way as the latter to mitigate murder to man-
slaughter if the defendant could persuade the jury that he was acting
under provocation. One commentator, writing after the Supreme
Court grant of certiorari but before the final Patterson decision, noted
the similarity of the two statutory schemes and stated in the conclud-
ing sentence of his article that "i]t would not be surprising were the
Supreme Court to reverse with a one-word opinion-'Mullaney'."251
The Court proved to be neither so succinct nor so predictable. The
majority held that New York had complied with the due process re-
quirements of Winship by proving a death, the intent to kill, and
causation-every fact necessary to constitute the crime as defined by
the state. 252 Patterson purported to distinguish, not overrule, Mul-
laney, even though Maine had also proved every element of the
single crime of "felonious murder" as defined by its Supreme Judicial
Court. The distinction was that in Maine, "malice aforethought and
heat of passion on sudden provocation are two inconsistent
things." 253  The reference to malice in the statute carried no factual
meaning except the absence of provocation.2 54 Thus, "malice, in the
sense of the absence of provocation, was part of the definition of that
crime [murder]," 255 but the state had shifted the burden of persua-
sion on this element of the crime as defined by the state. This was a
violation of due process in Mullaney, but New York had defined the
basic crime, murder, without reference to the element essential to
the affirmative defense.2 56
Writing for a majority of five, Justice White attempted to head off
the dissent's criticism that the decision would allow the states to
evade the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt simply by redefining crimes, 257 with his broad suggestion that
"obvious" constitutional constraints limit the states' freedom to define
crimes. 258  But since no content was given to these "obvious" limits,
Justice Powell was justified in insisting that,
250. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 220-21 (Powell J., dissenting). See also Com-
ment, Affirmative Defenses, supra note 249, at 196.
251. Comment, Affirmative Defenses, supra note 249, at 199.
252. 432 U.S. at 205-06.
253. Id. at 213 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 686-87).
254. 432 U.S. at 215-16.
255. Id. at 216.
256. See text accompanying note 252 supra.
257. See 432 U.S. at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, the author of Mullaney,
was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
258. Id. at 210.
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[the test the Court today establishes allows a legislature to shift, virtually
at will, the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal
case, so long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of that factor
in the statutory language that defines the crime. The sole requirement is
that any references to the factor be confined to those sections that provide
for an ,fffirmative defense.
. . . What Winship and Mullaney had sought to teach about the limits a
free society places on its procedures to safeguard the liberty of its citizens
becomes a rather simplistic lesson in statutory draftsmanship. 259
Patterson reduces Mullaney to a stern warning to the legislative
branch to exercise caution in drafting statutory crimes. Sandstrom in
light of Allen cautions drafters to create statutes and jury instructions
that invite but do not expressly require juries to find one fact from
proof of another. Both Patterson and Allen teach that adhering to the
Court's lessons in draftsmanship will virtually immunize a deductive
device or a defense from review.
B. The Fear of Inducing Harsher Legislative Reactions
There is more than a superficial coincidence between the diminu-
tion of Sandstrom by Allen and the evisceration of Mullaney by Pat-
terson. It is clear that both affirmative defenses and deductive devices
impinge upon the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Consider
259. Id. at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting).
A less formalistic interpretation of Patterson than Justice Powell's location analysis is possible.
Perhaps two differing substantive views of the mitigation of intentional murder by some type of
provocation are embodied in the Maine and New York statutes. In New York, provocation in no
way robs the actor of an intent to kill. Proof of provocation-extreme emotional disturbance-
results in a lesser penalty because a defendant who kills while provoked is deemed less
blameworthy than one who kills absent such provocation, even though both killed intentionally.
Under the Maine view of the defense, however, the cool-headed deliberation required for mur-
der (malice aforethought) is negated by or inconsistent with actions taken under the influence of
great provocation (in the heat of passion). In New York, manslaughter is truly a defensive mat-
ter, since the defendant convicted of this lesser charge has violated all the statutory elements of
the greater crime. In Maine, the defendant convicted of manslaughter was found not to possess
the required mental state for homicide.
The two versions of provocation are similar to the differing views of the defense of entrap-
ment. Under one view, the focus is on the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime.
Under the other view, the integrity of law enforcement activity is paramount and the defense is
designed to deter the instigation of crime by government officials. Under the latter view, the
defense can be made out even though the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime,
while the former view is enmeshed with the question of the existence of the requisite mens rea
element of a crime. Compare the majority opinion in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932), with the concurring opinion of Justice Roberts joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, id.
at 453. See also Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the
Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 390, 414-18 (1976).
Justice Powell's concern with the ease of evasion of the due process requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt remains valid under an interpretation of Patterson that gives greater
recognition to the substantive differences in the defenses in the two states. Under Patterson,
legislative or judicial characterization of a defense as unrelated to the required elements of a
crime will suffice to eliminate the requirement of prosecution proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
For a summary of an argument that such legislative flexibility is desirable, see notes 267-75 and
accompanying text infra.
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some of the ways in which a legislature might lessen the task of pros-
ecution for the crime of rape. The legislature might define rape as
nonconsensual intercourse with a woman other than the defendant's
wife, but shift the burden of persuasion on the element of consent to
the defendant. This shift would clearly violate the strictures of Mul-
laney. But the legislature has been provided with formulas by
MullaneylPatterson and SandstromlAllen to enable it to accomplish
the same result without judicial interference. Under Patterson, the
legislature could simply make intercourse with a person other than a
spouse the crime, and, in another section of the statute labeled as an
affirmative defense, provide for mitigation or exculpation of the crime
upon proof of the consensual nature of the intercourse. Allen suggests
another alternative: enacting a statutory device providing that upon
proof of intercourse the jury may, but need not, find that the act was
nonconsensual. If there is evidence in the record from which a jury
reasonably could find lack of consent, and if the jury instruction is
clearly permissive, a conviction under this statute would also be sus-
tained.
How can such formalistic distinctions be defended? One motive for
such results might be fear that if the Court continued on the path
suggested by Mullaney and the line of cases from Tot to Barnes that
indicated an increasingly strict review of deductive devices, the result
would be to induce the legislature to withdraw mitigating defenses
completely. To illustrate by returning to the hypothetical rape stat-
ute, the legislature might redefine rape so as to eliminate the ele-
ment of lack of consent altogether. To meet the objection that this
would not constitute rape at all, it might be contended that the crime
is fornication, but the penalty is being increased from the present six
months to thirty years. Arguments about whether the crime is ordi-
nary fornication or a vicious assault could be directed to the judge at
sentencing. 260 Although it may be argued that the possibility of
thirty years imprisonment for the act of consensual intercourse would
violate the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, the contemporary development of that doctrine does not
appear to provide a basis for the judiciary to strike down such a stat-
ute. Illustrative of the typical response to an eighth amendment claim
of grossly disproportionate punishment is that of the District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina in Perkins v. North
Carolina. 261 The Perkins court sustained a sentence of twenty to
thirty years imposed for a single act of consensual fellatio because the
260. Even the most extreme proponents of an expansive reading of Mullaney have not
suggested that the requirement extends to issues at sentencing. See, e.g., Jeffries & Stephan,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1352-53
(1979).
261. 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
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penalty was within "the astounding statutory limit of 'not less than
five nor more than sixty years'." 262 Perkins is typical not only of the
courts' deferential attitude in the application of the eighth amend-
ment, 26 3 but also of the customary judicial reluctance to police the
limits of the substantive criminal law. The courts have regarded pro-
cedural matters as well-suited for judicial determination, but the sub-
stantive content of the law has largely been left for political determi-
nation in the legislative arena. 264
There are several indications in Patterson that the Court retreated
from Mullaney out of this fear of inducing harsher legislative solu-
tions. The Court pointedly expressed its concern in a footnote:
There is some language in Mullaney that has been understood as perhaps
construing the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting "the degree of criminal cul-
pability".... It is said that such a rule would deprive legislatures of any
discretion whatsoever in allocating the burden of proof, the practical effect
of which might be to undermine legislative reform of our criminal justice
system .... Carried to its logical extreme, such a reading of Mullaney
might also, for example, discourage Congress from enacting pending legis-
lation to change the felony-murder rule by permitting the accused to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense that the
homicide committed was neither a necessary nor a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the underlying felony .... The Court did not intend Mul-
laney to have such far-reaching effect. 265
The Court's withdrawal from scrutiny of the content of presumptions
and affirmative defenses is more understandable in light of the legisla-
tive freedom to define crimes without judicial intervention. Under
the hypothetical rape statutes, a defendant given the option of either
an affirmative defense or rebutting an inference would at least have
the opportunity to escape conviction for rape if he could persuade the
jury that there had been consent. Strict requirements forbidding
shifts in the burden of proof through the establishment of an affirma-
tive defense or a presumption could lead to legislatures simply
eliminating the mitigating defense or the deductive device. Such
262. Id. at 337 (emphasis in original).
263. The possibility of a revitalized disproportionality doctrine under the eighth amendment
was raised by Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). In Coker, the Court ruled that imposition
of the death penalty for the crime of rape violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 592. The prospects for revitalization were dimmed last term in Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), where the Court upheld a mandatory life sentence following
conviction under a Texas recidivist statute. The Texas statute mandates a life sentence for the
conviction of a felony following conviction for two prior felonies. Although Rummel's three
felonies were all nonviolent property crimes which involved money totaling approximately $230,
the Court rejected his claim that a life sentence was grossly disproportionate under the eighth
amendment. Id. at 285. Coker was distinguished because of the unique nature of the penalty of
death. Id. at 272.
264. Id. at 274 & n.ll.
265. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 214-15 n.15 (citations omitted). The Court made
similar observations at 208-09 and at 209 n. 13.
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legislative redefinition occurred with the statutes involved in Leary
and Turner. Mere possession of marihuana and a large number of
narcotics and drugs were made federal offenses by one comprehen-
sive statute that repealed the former statutes containing the deductive
devices construed in Leary and Turner.2 66
Despite the validity of the Court's concern with inducing harsher
legislative reactions, most academic commentators have failed to
come to terms with the possibility of unreined legislative redefinition
of crimes in advocating the demise of affirmative defenses and pre-
sumptions in the criminal law.2 67 One exception is Professor John C.
Jeffries, Jr., of the University of Virginia, whose work with Professor
Peter W. Low was cited in Patterson.2 68  Professor Jeffries, col-
laborating with Paul B. Stephan, has pointed out that the difference
between an element and a defensive matter is essentially arbitrary, as
Patterson illustrated. In fact, the difference between elements and
defenses had been defined by reference to the procedural effect of
whether the state or the defendant bears the burden of production or
persuasion.2 69  Jeffries and Stephan were critical of the purely pro-
cedural interpretation of Winship that would require the state to bear
the burdens of production and persuasion every time the state drew a
distinction affecting the defendant's culpability but would leave the
state free to define the elements of a crime as it wished. The propo-
nents of this procedural view of the reasonable doubt requirement
often defend their position by citing various horror stories that could
occur if the state were freely allowed to shift the burden of proving
defenses.27 ° For example, one commentator hypothesized a com-
prehensive statute of "personal attack" to include all homicide and
assault offenses. Without a bar against burden-shifting devices, "a
legislature could authorize conviction and punishment for that crime
on proof of a trivial assault, with the burden on the defendant to
establish the mitigating defenses of the victim's survival, his freedom
from injury, or the defendant's lack of intent to harm or injure." 27 1
Jefifries and Stephan cogently argued that a procedural rule forbidding
shifting the burden of persuasion is a non sequitur to the prevention
of the substantive injustice of this type of statute because the
hypothetical legislature that would be prevented by such a strict pro-
266. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236. See also Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law:
Another View, 1970 Duke L.J. 919, 922-23 (1970).
267. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 260, at 1340 n.40, 1348, 1353.
268. Low & Jeffries, DICTA: Constitutionalizing the Criminal Law? Va. L. Weekly (March
25, 1977), cited in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. at 208, 214-15 n.15.
269. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 260, at 1332.
270. Id. at 1357-58.
271. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1324 (1977), cited in Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 260, at 1357.
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cedural rule from making a defense of a fact bearing on culpability
could simply eliminate the "defense" as an element.
Proponents of a strict procedural view of the reasonable doubt re-
quirement have assumed that forcing legislative abandonment of
burden-shifting defenses and presumptions will result in defenses
being retained and expanded despite an absolute requirement that
the prosecution must bear the risk of nonpersuasion. 272 Although
predicting legislative reaction to a hypothetical procedural rule is
necessarily speculative, Jeffries and Stephan recognized that "[t]he
best evidence of what legislatures would do if they were forced to
abandon the affirmative defense is the catalogue of uses to which that
device is currently put."273 Surveying the practices of thirty-three
American states that have recently enacted comprehensive revisions
of their penal laws, Jeffries and Stephan discovered that, in general,
affirmative defenses were used to offer the defendant an exculpatory
route that had not been available at common law.2 74 Based on this
survey the authors concluded that forbidding the creation of affirma-
tive defenses and presumptions "would thwart legislative reform of
the penal law and stifle efforts to undo injustice in the traditional law
of crimes."'2 75  Stephan and Jeffries urged that the "intermediate
power" of allowing defenses and presumptions that shift burdens to
the defendant should be retained.
Jeffries and Stephan would disapprove of Allen. 276  They would
argue that it is illogical to treat inferences more stringently than pre-
sumptions. According to their analysis, appellate courts should ask: Is
the basic fact of a deductive device a sufficient basis to impose crimi-
nal liability? If that question is answered affirmatively, then the state
should be permitted any of the lesser options of a permissive infer-
ence, a mandatory presumption, or an affirmative defense. Jeffries
and Stephan thus would champion the re-emergence of justice
Holmes's long-dormant doctrine of the-greater-includes-the-lesser. 277
This analysis has the advantage of forcing the courts to abandon
formalistic evasions by developing substantive boundaries within
which legislatures are free to experiment with new defenses
that may shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. The for-
272. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 260, at 1353, 1354.
273. Id. at 1354.
274. Id. at 1355 no.83-91. Jeffries and Stephan catalogued some affirmative defenses and the
frequency of their appearance as follows: the defense of renunciation for the crime of theft (13
states); reasonable mistake as to age for the crime of statutory rape (9 states); affirmative de-
fenses to felony murder (8 states); reasonable reliance on an official misstatement of law (6
states). id.
275. Id. at 1353.
276. Of course, Jeffries and Stephan wrote prior to the decision in Allen. The extrapolation of
their likely position on Allen is based upon their treatment of Gainey, id. at 1395-97.
277. For a discussion of the greater-incldes-the-lesser analysis, which was rejected as a test
for the validity of deductive devices in Tot, see notes 95-97 and accompanying text supra.
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malistic determinations that result from the tandems of Mullaney/
Patterson and AllenlSandstron merely sanction withdrawal by the
courts from meaningful review if all formalities are observed. A mean-
ingful judicial check requires that the courts determine what the
"greater power" is, or in other words, what the limits of the substan-
tive criminal law are. Jeffries and Stephan have urged that the Su-
preme Court begin to define these limits.2 7
Consistent with the doctrine of the-greater-includes-the-lesser, Jef-
fries and Stephan have urged that "[a]ny functional construction of
the reasonable doubt standard, however, will treat presumptions and
affirmative defenses the same." 279  Their reasoning is based on the
similarity between the two, which the hypothetical rape statutes
demonstrate.
Although the Jeffries and Stephan analysis is compelling as applied
to affirmative defenses, the analysis does not deal satisfactorily with
the propensity of deductive devices to operate beyond the evidence.
A legislature may be able to convert the basic fact of a permissive
inference into the crime itself or to convert the basic fact into the
crime with the defendant having to establish an affirmative defense in
order to escape culpability: for example, instead of providing that the
crime of carrying on an illegal still may be found upon proof of pres-
ence at an illegal still, the legislature may simply create the crime of
presence at an illegal still. Alternatively, the legislature could create
the crime of presence and also the defense of presence unrelated to
carrying on an illegal distillery, which the defendant must prove.
There remains, however, a legitimate interest in preventing arbitrary
decisions as to guilt, however guilt is defined. The logic of the-
greater-includes-the-lesser does not mean that because the state may
eliminate a "defense" to a crime, it would also be acceptable to retain
the defense but deny the defendant the right to counsel in presenting
it. Decisionmaking without counsel could lead to arbitrary results un-
related to the merits of the case. An intelligent, verbally proficient
defendant might be able to persuade a jury of the defense, whereas a
defendant with an equally meritorious case but less ability might not.
Not all attorneys have equal skills, but the law generally assumes
some minimal level of expertise to deal with the law's complexities, at
least absent gross deviations from reasonable competence. Similarly, a
legislature's ability to convert the basic fact of a permissive inference
278. See Jeffries & Stephen, supra note 260, at 1365-78. The authors have pointed to the
eighth amendment proportionality doctrine, the concept of an actus rea, and mens rea as "con-
stitutional minima" that can be used to build such an analysis. Id.
279. Id. at 1338. Other commentators have also taken this position. See Allen, The Restora-
tion of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson
v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30, 60 (1977); Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions,
and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 189 (1969).
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into the crime itself should not mean that a legislature should be
able, by creating deductive devices, to imperil the independent value
of ensuring the nonarbitrary nature of the factfinding process. Deduc-
tive devices should be eliminated from the criminal law or modified
to eliminate the danger that the jury will decide cases based on
generalizations divorced from the facts. The concern with legislative
flexibility and the danger of inducing harsh legislative responses can
be met by allowing legislatures to turn presumed facts into affirmative
defenses. Affirmative defenses do not extend the invitation to arbitrar-
iness inherent in deductive devices because the decision whether a
defense to the crime has been proved is grounded in the evidence
presented. 280
If deductive devices are to be retained in any form, they should be
phrased so as to avoid the problem of extending the invitation to
decide guilt on the basis of a generalization divorced from the facts.
Professor Charles Nesson of Harvard University has suggested that
jurors could be informed that the basic fact was considered highly
probative of the presumed fact, and that it might, when considered
together with other evidence, be used to find guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt:
[I]f framed in a manner which does not abstract the predicate fact from its
overall circumstantial context, the instruction should be acceptable. An
example would be an instruction which informed the jurors that evidence
of Gainey's presence at the still was highly probative on the question
whether he was operating the still and could, when considered together
with other circumstantial evidence which the jurors might credit, warrant
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Such formulations of permis-
sive inferences would avoid any explicit authorization to draw a naked in-
ference from predicate to conclusion, and yet would accomplish the legis-
lature's objectives. 281
Perhaps the most effective way to instruct the jury in a manner
which does not "abstract the predicate" is to inform the jury of the
facts that formerly resulted in the creation of a deductive device. In
other words, the jury should be informed of legislative findings, such
as the level of illegally imported drugs in the case of statutes like
those in Leary and Turner. The advantages are that the jury would
be given the benefit of the factfinding ability of the legislature, and
the prosecution would be relieved of the task of producing evidence
280. It may appear to an individual defendant that he is in a better position with a deductive
device than with an affirmative defense, since the defendant must produce evidence to put an
affirmative defense at issue and with some defenses must persuade the jury as to the existence
of the defense. Sandstrom held that a mandatory presumption shifting the burden of persuasion
is unconstitutional. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979). From the point of
view of structuring an entire system, however, replacing deductive devices with affirmative
defenses strengthens the nonarbitrary operation of the decisionmaking process.
281. Nesson, supra note 152, at 1223.
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in every case of frequently recurring fact situations. The instructions
would function as expert testimony but would not authorize convic-
tion based upon the operation of a generalization divorced from the
facts of the case. The defendant should be allowed to introduce evi-
dence disputing the legislative facts or evidence showing that once
accurate data is now out of date. 282 If it is objected that this method
is cumbersome, it should be remembered that the present method
allows the legislative findings to be embodied in a single abstract and
sometimes ambiguous jury instruction 283 authorizing conviction.
Under the approach suggested here, it would no longer be necessary
to belabor the question whether the connection between the facts of
a deductive device must satisfy a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
or a lesser standard. The dismantling of deductive devices into state-
ments of legislative facts results in those facts being considered along
with all others adduced at trial. The general standard of beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt would guide the jury's deliberations without distinc-
tion between legislative and evidentiary facts. Only the method of
presentation of the facts would differ.
282. A possible manner of implementing this system would be to authorize the prosecutor to
read the legislative findings to the jury at the close of the state's case just as stipulations are
now commonly presented. This method would have two advantages: first, the legislative find-
ings would come from the prosecutor and not the judge; thus, the likelihood that the jury would
give the facts undue weight would be reduced. Second, the defense would be alerted to the
prosecution's reliance on the legislative findings. If the findings are given in instructions to the
jury only after the close of the presentation of evidence by both parties, the jury may be
confused by the defense rebuttal to evidence that it has not yet heard.
283. A collateral benefit of the proposal urged here would be to force clarification of the
message intended for the jury. For example, until 1977, the State of Wisconsin maintained a
presumptive intent jury instruction similar to the one involved in Sandstrom: "When there are
no circumstances to prevent or rebut the presumption, the law presumes that a reasonable
person intends all the natural, probable, and usual consequences of his deliberate acts." Muller
v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 469, 289 N.W.2d 570, 580 (1980).
The general proposition that when someone acts, he or she intends the consequences that
flow from those actions, is so abstract as to be insusceptible to demonstration in a court of law.
Philosophers have debated such questions for centuries in terms that are foreign to the prosaic
business of the courts.
The Wisconsin Uniform Jury Instruction Committee, anticipating the due process concerns
announced in Sandstrom, adopted a substitute instruction two years before the opinion. The
new instruction eliminates the vague inferential equation between acts and intention and substi-
tutes a more direct statement that helps the jury understand the difficult problem of determin-
ing a subjective mental state from objective evidence:
"Intent to-must be found as a fact before you can find the defendant guilty
of-. You cannot look into a person's mind to find out his/her intent. You may
determine such intent directly or indirectly from all the facts in evidence concern-
ing this offense. You may consider any statements or conduct of the defendant
which indicate his/her state of mind. You may find intent to-from such statements
or conduct. You are the sole judges of the facts and you must not find the defendant
guilty unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in-
tended to-."
Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 470 n.6, 289 N.W.2d 570, 580 n.6 (1980). Asking legislatures




The impact of Sandstrom and Allen undoubtedly will be to encour-
age the use of permissive inferences rather than mandatory presump-
tions. Sandstrom will discourage any deviation from permissive lan-
guage, while Allen will exempt the carefully drafted inference from
facial appellate review. Although the Allen majority fabricated a re-
visionist history that claimed a long tradition for its treatment of de-
ductive devices, in fact Allen reversed decades of decisions in which
rationality was the touchstone of the Court's analysis. The withdrawal
from meaningful review of the rationality of permissive inferences is
also contrary to the Burger Court's recent focus on the rationality of
the factfinding process typified by cases like Sandstrom.
Allen's diminution of Sandstrom follows instead another recent ten-
dency of the Court: to resolve difficult questions of the due process
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with simplistic draft-
ing formulas. In this respect, Allen and Sandstrom echo the formalis-
tic tandem of Mullaney v. Wilbur and Patterson v. New York in the
related area of affirmative defenses. Permissive inferences are en-
shrined in the criminal law by Sandstrom and Allen because infer-
ences satisfy the Court's preoccupation with a formalistic prohibition
against shifts in the burden of proof.
Although permissive inferences do not shift either a production or a
persuasion burden to the defendant, they imperil other due process
concerns. By permitting the factfinder to reach a verdict on the basis
of a conclusionary formula and by exerting a coercive effect that oper-
ates beyond the evidence, permissive inferences can produce arbi-
trary results in a way that cannot be safeguarded against by a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review. Nonarbitrary de-
cisionmaking would be enhanced if permissive inferences were elimi-
nated from the criminal law. If inferences are retained, the present
practice should be reversed so that the jury is informed of the under-
lying facts that led to the creation of the inference instead of its un-
substantiated and unreviewed conclusion.
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